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# BOSTON UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL

#### Dissertation

IDEALISTIC TENDENCIES IN SOME RECENT NATURALISM

by

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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION


#### The Problem

- i. Investigation and Evaluation of Idealistic Tendencies in Some Recent Naturalism
- G. K. Chesterton writes thus of the pervasive practical implications of a philosophical point of view:

There are some people, and I am one of them, who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for allandlady considering a lodger, it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy, it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but it is still more important to know the enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether, in the long run, anything else affects them.

E. S. Brightman describes the philosophical spirit as "the thinking attitude" devoted to truth. la Were it possible to inculcate in all persons the steadfast intention thoughtfully to seek truth in all situations, the lot of mankind would, no doubt, be a far happier one, although probably still far removed from unanimity of opinion as long as individual minds

<sup>1.</sup> Chesterton, Her., 15. la. Brightman, ITP, 18-20.



are free to pursue individual trends of thought. Through the ages, sincere men have been engaged in an earnest search for truth, and have arrived at the diametrically opposed conclusions of idealism and materialism.

The history of philosophy is a record of the breach between these two philosophical views. Essentially, their ditferences have not changed since Plato said that God is the measure of all things, while Protagoras proclaimed man as the measure of all things. For the one, God, in his love, created the universe; for the other, physical nature is the self-sufficient cause of all. For one, man, "a little lower than the angels," has been endowed with an immortal soul; for the other, man, "of the earth, earthy," is composed of a few cents' worth of chemicals, and will vanish with the dissolution of his body. In one view, God has provided man with a sense of right and wrong, and has given him a set of moral laws for the guidance of his conduct; in the other, morality, like fashion, may change with the season, and is a matter of pleasure or utility or expediency. The view "that treats personality seriously and sacredly has in it the seeds of hope -- hope that humanity may see" that effective realization is possible "only by the labors of reason and love, human and divine."1b

lb. Brightman, NV, 166.

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Until the twentieth century, the demarcation between these two systems of thought was of chiseled precision, with no slightest suggestion of a blurring of the cleavage. Materialism was the negation of idealism.

Recent naturalism, however, influenced by modern science, seems inclined to a less rigid opposition. Tendrils of naturalistic thought seem to be reaching toward idealism. to these tendrils that this dissertation is devoted. though some of them may seem, nevertheless, they mark a departure from an age-old position, and they may be the forerunners of deeper changes.

### ii. Survey of the Literature

Inasmuch as recent naturalism is regarded as a distinctively American system, 1c research has been accordingly governed. The sources include books and articles from the pens of both idealists and naturalists, and also dissertations based on related studies.

John Dewey, as the founder of modern naturalism, and, in the opinion of some, as the only American who has founded a regular philosophic school, ld merits first attention. mong his many philosophical publications, those particularly valuable to this work include: The Influence of Darwin on


• Philosophy; Essays in Experimental Logic; Creative Intelligence; Reconstruction in Philosophy; Experience and Nature:
The Quest for Certainty; A Common Faith; and Theory of Valuation.

Dewey was influenced by his predecessors in the Pragmatic movement--Charles Peirce, who held that the real meaning of an idea is the practical effect it will have in action, and William James, who, twenty years later, developed Peirce's view. Darwin's theory of evolution was also an important factor in the formulation of Dewey's philosophy, as was Francis Bacon's emphasis upon empirical observation and analysis of observed data.

Dewey's influence has been world-wide. He has spent time in Germany, England, France, Russia, and two years in China. His <u>Reconstruction in Philosophy</u> consists of lectures delivered at the Imperial University in Tokyo.

As is usual with those of extensive influence, there exists a variety of opinions regarding Dewey. He has enthusiastic defenders and bitter opponents. As the central figure in the philosophical system treated in this work, a brief consideration of a few of these comments seems indicated.

In an article in <u>Mind</u>, G. C. Field deplores Dewey's unfair treatment of Aristotle. He writes:



Where he Dewey does mention a particular thinker or school of thought by name, he rarely does justice to them, and in some cases simply misunderstands them. . . To Aristotle, indeed, Prof. Dewey is consistently unfair throughout. He writes of him as if Aristotle had written nothing but the second part of the Tenth Book of the Ethics, and he betrays no appreciation of the fact that in reality Aristotle shared and antigipated many of his own most fundamental doctrines.

On the other hand, there are encomiums such as this by Kil-Patrick:

I see in Professor Dewey the modest sincerity of Socrates, the radical constructive thinking of Plato, the balanced outlook of Aristotle. Like Socrates, he too has brought philosophy down from the clouds to dwell among men. Like Plato, he has married philosophy and education with like fertile results. Like Aristotle, he has mediated conflicts, but less often by finding a "mean" between contending elements than by showing the unreality of conflict and shifting the problem to more fruitful lines.


In the <u>Journal of Philosophy</u>, W. H. Sheldon expresses the opinion that Professor Dewey

is the democratic philosopher in the world of American democracy, as Hegel was the aristocratic philosopher in the world of Prussian aristocracy, and he carries democracy to quite as great an extreme as did Hegel his aristocracy.4

<sup>2.</sup> Field, art.(1923).

<sup>3.</sup> Kilpatrick, art. (1928).

<sup>4.</sup> Sheldon, art. (1921).



Arthur Kenyon Rogers forms the following estimate of Dewey's philosophy:

It cannot be denied that in the interest of making <u>all</u> judgments practical, and <u>all</u> objects of knowledge ideals, Dewey has created a highly **speculative** philosophy, whose practical value seems at best only the negative one of clearing away supposed mental obstacles to change and reconstruction.<sup>5</sup>

H. Wildon Carr finds that Dewey's "style is never lucid or technical, and the meaning is often obscure," and that "we cannot help feeling that Professor Dewey's doctrine draws much of its fascination from its being kept in the background." Waldo Frank considers that "The lack of organic wholeness brings an isolatedness to Mr. Dewey's pages of philosophy, and makes it far easier to set them down than to take them up." He accepts Dewey as a leader of childhood, but not as a leader of maturity, because


he cannot see man whole, because he fails to find the nucleus of focus, of organization, of timeless subject-value, and of transformation within the self. He is himself a child of chaos, and his works are chaos.

Woodbridge reports that, in reply to a simple question, such as, "Surely the state before change begins cannot itself

<sup>5.</sup> Rogers, EAP, 393.

<sup>6.</sup> Carr, art. (1926).

<sup>7.</sup> Frank, art. (1928).



also change. Is there not something about the past that never again changes?"

Dewey defined and distinguished and qualified, in such a maze of dialectic, that not only did I not get any answer, I didn't even know where my question went to. And do you know, when he gets that way, he thinks he is being empirical.

Such are some of the opinions regarding the personality, which, more than any other, has influenced recent naturalistic thought. Regardless of individual judgments concerning him, all must concede that he is a force in his century.

Roy Wood Sellars' system, which is particularly marked by idealistic tendencies, has received considerable attention. Among his works especially to be noted in connection with this study are: Critical Realism; The Essentials of Philosophy: Evolutionary Naturalism; The Philosophy of Physical Realism; and The Principles and Problems of Philosophy.

Yervant H. Krikorian's volume, <u>Naturalism and the Human Spirit</u>, a collection of essays by representative naturalists, has provided a thoroughgoing analysis from the naturalistic viewpoint upon many of the perennial philosophical problems.

And Edgar S. Brightman's <u>Nature and Values</u> is described on

<sup>8.</sup> Costello, art. (1944).



the dust-jacket as "an answer to the program set forth in the recent symposium entitled <u>Naturalism and the Human</u>

<u>Spirit.</u>" Also to be mentioned at this point is Peter A.


Bertocci's "The Logic of Naturalistic Arguments Against

Theis ic Hypotheses," which is a reply to Sterling P. Lamprecht's "Naturalism and Religion," one of the essays in the naturalistic "symposium."

Other naturalistic authors receiving consideration include Henry Melson Wieman, Max Carl Otto, and Irwin Edman.

The idealistic position herein set forth is essentially the view of Borden Parker Bowne and Edgar S. Brightman. Other idealistic sources include works of W. E. Hocking, Kant, Hegel, Berkeley, and Hegel.

Very special appreciation is due Dr. Arthur W. Munk for his invaluable dissertation entitled Roy Wood Sellars' Criticisms of Idealism, and also to Dr. Francis G. Ensley for his dissertation, an exhaustive work entitled The Naturalistic Interpretation of Religion by John Dewey.



#### CHAPTER II

## MAIN TRAITS OF TRADITIONAL IDEALISM AND OF TRADITIONAL MATERIALISM

#### 1. Idealism

i. Brief Survey of the History

Since man first turned his attention to speculative thought, he has been engaged in controversy about two conflicting world views. The fundamental rift concerns the nature of the basal reality: for idealism, the ultimate reality is mental; for the opposing view, materialism, it is nonmental.

(1) Origin and Development of Idealism. Although the term idealism first appeared during the latter part of the 17th century, it designates a philosophical position traceable to the dawn of thought. Long goes so far as to say that

inasmuch as pure or basic Materialism has been an infrequent doctrine among major thinkers, the history of philosophy broadly understood is largely the history of Idealism.

Primitive, animism, "the belief in mental agencies as causing natural phenomena," marked man's first progress

<sup>1.</sup> Long, art.(1942). 2. Hocking, TOP, 252.

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toward philosophy, and likewise his initial step toward idealism. McDougall writes of the idealistic trend in man's earliest search for ultimate causes:

It would seem that from a very remote period men of almost all races have entertained the belief that the living man differs from the corpse in that his body contains some more subtle thing or principle which determines its purposive movements, its growth and self-repair, and to which is due his capacity for sensation, thought, and feeling. The belief in some such animating principle, or soul, is held by almost every existing race of men, no matter how lowly their grade of culture nor how limited their mental powers; and we find evidences of a similar belief among the earliest human records.

Oriental philosophy, from its incipiency, has borne the stamp of idealism. In India, intimations of advanced theism appear in the Rig Veda, and the early <u>Upanishads</u> are idealistic in character. Traditional Chinese metaphysics rests upon basic concepts of idealism. In Persia, Zarathustra taught that Nature was controlled by Ahura Mazda, the personalized spirit of Good. In Israel, during the period of the written prophets, Jewish thought regarded the cosmic "I AM" as "a personal and righteous World Ground who fashions and controls both Nature and human history."

Many of the early Greek thinkers were idealists. There

<sup>3.</sup> McDougall, BM, 1.

<sup>4.</sup> Long, art. (1942).

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are idealistic leanings among the Eleatics. Parmenides, for example, in his poem "On Truth," teaches that the sensible world is one of appearance and illusion, and that logical thought compels a conception of true reality as one changeless "Being." 5 Xenophanes, too, writes idealistically:

There is one god, supreme among gods and men; resembling mortals neither in form nor in mind. The whole of him sees, the whole of him thinks, the whole of him hears. Without toil he reles all things by the power of his mind.

Heraclitus says that "Man's own character is his daemon," and he conceives the Logos as the enduring rational principle in a universe of change. 7 Idealistic elements are found in Anaxagoras' teaching. He introduced the Nous, Mind, as the force which arranges and guides the world. "Mind knows all things," he said, and "mind also regulated all things."8

In the history of early Greek idealism, Socrates attained the heights in his recognition of the soul or self as the mainspring of all men's actions; 9 in his emphasis upon the teleological principle: 10 and in his introduction of the category of Value as of first importance both in Nature

Fishler, art.(1942).
 Bakewell, SAP, 8.
 Thilly, HOP, 25.
 Bakewell, SAP, 52.

<sup>9.</sup> Zeller, OGP, 105. 10. Toid., 111.

and in Man. 11

Plato was the first great idealist to attempt the formulation of a comprehensive system. He "is a dualist or a pluralist. The Receptacle (certainly) and the Pattern (probably) are external to God."12 His idealism appears unmistakably in his opposition to materialism, 13 in his insistence upon the objectivity of value, 14 and in his emphasis upon the primacy of mind. 15 He teaches that

soul is prior to body, body secondary and derivative, soul governing in the real order of things and body being subject to governance. . . . Soul, then, by her own morions stirs all things in sky, earth, or sea. In

Aristotle continued the idealistic trend of Greek thought, combining it with his naturalistic views. He held that active reason is immaterial and eternal, and is found in all rational creatures; that God is perfect rationality or self-contemplating reason, and the "form of forms;" that He is the Prime Mover who causes the evolution of the world without doing anything. His teleological metaphysic consists in an eternal evolution, guided by purpose, from

<sup>11.</sup> Zeller, OGP, 108-110; Plato, Rep., I, 334B,C.

<sup>12.</sup> Brightman, POR, 339.
13. Plato, Rep., X, 476A, 597B; VI, 508B.
14. Plato, Rep., IV, 441C,D; IX, 583B,C; Phaedo, 64A-67B.
15. Plato, Rep., IX, 617E, 619B; Laws, X, 904B.

<sup>16.</sup> Plato, Laws, X, 896C.

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potentiality to actuality. 17

St. Augustine taught that thought, and therefore the thinker, is the most certain of all things. The theistic philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas is strictly Aristotelian and idealistic.

Idealistic leanings appear in the thought of various philosophers of the seventeenth century. Descartes developed his system upon the theoretical premise of the conception of a God whose moral perfection will not permit Him to deceive; hence, man is assured of the reality of the physical world revealed by his senses. From his hypothesis of universal doubt, Descartes is led to the doctrine of the conscious self. Because the act of doubting necessitates a doubter, Descartes concludes, "I am, I exist, that is certain." Pursuing his logic, he affirms the existence of the conscious self, of God, and of an external world. He falls short of pure idealism, however, in his persistent dualistic conception of mind and nature, and of mind and body.

Also in the seventeenth century, Spinoza set forth his idealistic views. He taught that all reality is One Substance or God, of which mind and physical reality are two

<sup>17.</sup> Zeller, OGP, 182-185.

<sup>18.</sup> Descartes, MFT, 78.

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of an infinite number of attributes or aspects. All temporal existences are determinations or modes of these attributes, and are rigidly connected in the One Substance; hence, everything happens of necessity. Human freedom, or salvation, is to be attained by seeing things "sub specie aeternitatis," that is, through "intuitive knowledge" which understands and acquiesces in the necessity which proceeds from God's nature. "The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, which every idea involves, is adequate and perfect." Spinoza's philosophy is developed geometrically in the Ethica, his chief work. 20

During the same period, Leibniz advanced his rationalistic idealism in his Monadologie. He held that ultimately all reality consists of monads, which are indestructible and unchanging spiritual beings or souls. Monads differ in the degree to which they are conscious, that is, the degree to which they reflect the mind of God, and in this respect there is a continuous gradation from the clarity of human consciousness down to the dullness of inorganic things, which are like minds asleep. God, actus purus, is the Supreme Monad, the highest and perfect Being.

<sup>19.</sup> Spinoza, <u>Ethics</u>, II, Prop. XLVI. 20. Thilly, HOP, 292-306. 21. <u>Ibid.</u>, 267-374.

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Developing the Cartesian doctrine of the primacy of thought, Locke, a theist, has a germ of idealism in his theory of the subjectivity of all ideas. He denies the existence of moral principles, of categories, and of innate ideas, and he says, "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters without any ideas."

The content of the mind, a tabula rasa at birth, is attributable to sense-experience and to reflection upon sensory data.

Locke's theory of the subjective character of ideas led to a pure idealism in the mentalism of George Berkeley. Berkeley acknowledges only two really existent orders: God and spirits. Teaching that perception derives from the direct action of God upon finite spirits, he writes:

I find that I can excite ideas at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. . . . But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When . . . I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; . . . the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them. 23

Theories holding to the "absolute existence of sensible

<sup>22.</sup> Locke, EHU, 122.

<sup>23.</sup> Berkeley, PHK, in Fraser, WGB, I, 273.

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objects in themselves or without the mind" according to Berkeley "mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. . . . Their <u>esse</u> is <u>percipi</u>." <sup>24</sup> Fraser regards <u>esse</u> is <u>percipi</u> as Berkeley's initial principle, and refers to it as "intuitive" or "self-evident." <sup>25</sup>

Berkeleian mentalism inspired Hume's sensationalism, and Hume in turn stirred Kant from his "dogmatic slumber," and led to the Critical Philosophy. Kant taught the ideality of space and time. He held that theism, while beyond the realm of science and logically undemonstrable, is the conclusion of pure speculative reason.

To advance from the knowledge of one-self (the soul) to a mowledge of the world, and through it to a knowledge of the Supreme Being, is a progression so natural that it suggests the logical advance of reason from premises to conclusion. 27

Also, Kant affirmed that knowledge is **produced by** the synthetic activity of the logical self-consciousness upon the data of sense perception. He says that

thoughts without content are empty, perceptions without conceptions are blind; . . . and hence the complex content of pure perception must first be surveyed, taken up into thought and combined before there can

<sup>24.</sup> Berkeley, PHK, in Fraser, I, 270.

<sup>25. &</sup>lt;u>Tbid</u>., 259, footnote 3. 26. Kant, PTFM, 7.

<sup>27.</sup> Watson, TPK, 143.

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be any knowledge. This act I call synthesis . . . by which is meant the act of putting various ideas together and grasping their multiplicity in onc consciousness. . . The unity of apperception is the supreme principle of all our knowledge.

The Transcendental or Critical Idealism of Kant gave rise to the movement which began with the Subjective Idealism of Fichte, developed into the theism and Objective Idealism of Schelling, and culminated in the Absolute or logical Idealism of Hegel.

Fichte sought to perfect the Kantian system by relating the Practical Reason to the Pure Reason. He deduced a priori from the Ego, which is Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception," both the categories of the knowledge of nature, and also the doctrines of morals and rights, thus uniting the two critiques in one system, the "Science of Knowledge." His basic doctrine, which "he regards as the keystone of the critical philosophy," is the idea that the Ego, or will, is a free self-determining activity, and is the only true reality. 29

Schelling advanced the idealistic development by formulating a system which makes the ego and the world two poles of the Absolute. The phenomenal world is a product

<sup>28.</sup> Watson, TPK, 49, 67. 29. Thilly, HOP, 431-442.

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of the infinite activity of the Absolute Ego, and individual self-consciousness, the necessary categories of thought, and sense-perception are produced by the Absolute Reason. 30

Hegel taught that the universe is one absolute spirit or Idee expressing itself by an eternal dialectical process. By characteristic dialectical steps, Hegel passes from the formal and empty conception of Being, which logically equates to nothing, and advances to the fullest and richest conception, that of mind or spirit. "This," he writes, "is the supreme definition of the Absolute," and "the essential feature of mind or spirit is liberty;" and this free mind manifests itself in morality and law. 31

Lotze is among the prominent representatives of the new idealism which followed the decline of Hegelianism and the supremacy of materialism. He teaches that personality is the ultimate fact of fundamental significance; that God is good and is personal; that He is distinct from the world, the Creator of the cosmos, and the divine determinant of the last end of the world; that personality is the highest value and that the most valuable is also the most real. 32

<sup>30.</sup> Thilly, HOP, 450-457. 31. Hegel, POM, II, II, 328. 33. Thilly, HOP, 494-497.

"Minds," he writes, are Real," and "all that is Real is mind." Regarding Lotze's very considerable influence upon modern idealistic thought, Knudson has this to say:

It is largely to his influence that the revival of theism during the past thirty or forty years is due, a revival so marked that it is acknowledged to be the most striking movement in contemporary philosophy of religion.

Modern idealism, drawing elements from Berkeley, Leibniz, Hegel, Kant, and Lotze, as well as from Plato and Aristotle and from the Hebrew tradition, is represented in America by such men as Borden Parker Bowne, Josiah Royce, W.E.Hocking, J.B.Pratt, R.T.Flewelling, and E.S.Brightman. 35

(2) "Types of Idealism. The term idealism presents difficulties of classification. Idealism "is a very catholic and inclusive thing, a sort of Messianic Age in which the lion and the lamb lie down together." It embraces many divergent points of view, including such varied doctrines as those of Natorp and Bergson, of G.P.Adams and McTaggart, of Bosanquet and James Ward. It admits the personalistic system wherein the clue to reality inheres in the self-conscious self, and with broad catholicity it likewise admits

<sup>33.</sup> Lotze, MIC, I, 642.

<sup>34.</sup> Knudson, POP, 62.

<sup>35.</sup> Flewelling, art.(1942). 36. Brightman, POI, 165.

Bradley's system wherein, per contra, the self is held to be mere appearance, and the highest reality to be an impersonal Absolute. All are idealistic in that all regard reality as basically mental or psychical, and hence antimaterialistic. At the same time there are striking differences among them, suggesting certain classifications.

Both Hoernle and Brightman see idealism as falling into four chief forms. Hoernle classifies idealistic fiews
as follows:

(a) Spiritual Pluralism, which interprets Reality as a Society of Spirits; (b) Spiritual Monism,, which interprets Reality as the manifestation, or objectification of a single Spiritual Energy; (c) Critical (Kantian) Idealism, which avoids offering a theory of Reality but makes that every form of experience, because of the universal and necessary principles of 'Reason' in it, has a contribution to make to the theory of Reality; (d) Absolute Idealism, which attempts a synthetic, or synoptic, interpretation of Reality in the light of its various appearances.<sup>37</sup>

Brightman says that "there are at least four main types of idealism," and he lists them as follows:

The first, the Platonic, asserts the objectivity of value. The second, the Berkeleian, holds that all knowable reality, and perhaps all reality <u>überhaupt</u>, is of the nature of consciousness. The third, the Hegelian, points to the coherence of

<sup>37.</sup> Hoernlé, IAP, 306.

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one absolute system as the only true value of existence. The fourth, the Lotzean, finds in self-hood or personality an ultimate fact of fundamental significance. These are the great idealisms.

Inasmuch as Hoernie's classification omits Platonism,
Brightman's grouping seems the more comprehensive, and,
therefore, will be used as an index for the following brief
discussion of four chief forms of idealism.

- (i) Platonic idealism is marked by insistence upon the objectivity of value and the primacy of mind, and by opposition to materialism. 39 "Mind is the king of heaven and earth. . . Mind orders all things." 40
- (ii) Berkeleian idealism is a pure idealism which views all reality as of the nature of consciousness. It rests upon three fundamental concepts: the conception of matter; the conception of God; and the conception of the nature and status of human spirits. Berkeley rejects any conception of matter as a core of being supporting the qualities of things. Spirit is the sole support of things: "That there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident." Things are just as they are experienced in the perceiving mind; material reality is idea, for

<sup>38.</sup> Brightman, POI, 171.

<sup>39.</sup> Supra, M 40. Plato, Phileb., 29. 41. Berkeley, DHP, 101.

it is given in terms of idea and in no other way. "Esse is percipi, nor is it possible they things, should have any existence out of the minds of thinking things which perceive them." There are two kinds of ideas, active and passive. The former are contingent upon the will of the individual and can be shifted at pleasure, but the latter the individual must accept as given, for they are caused by God, the Supreme Agent, and constitute the unchangeable order of nature, "the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author." Things are ideas, complexes of sensations; human spirits are limited agents capable of entertaining and manipulating ideas. "I myself," says Berkeley, "am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas."

(iii) Hegelian idealism conceives the only true value of existence as residing in the coherence of one absolute system. The central idea in Hegel's system is his conception of Reality as an organic Whole, the parts of which can be understood only in their relationship to the Whole; considered in isolation, the parts are mere abstractions. "The

<sup>42.</sup> Berkeley, PHK, 259.

<sup>43. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, 274. 44. Berkeley, DHP, 95.

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truth is the Whole." It is not a static whole, but "a self-becoming, a self-development,"46 a dialectical process in which Spirit, representing the higher rational and spiritual capacities, is forever striving toward richer expression and more complete realization. 47 It is a rational process seeking the goal of Freedom conceived as a state in which the highest capabilities of man achieve the fullest possible realization. 48 The dynamic factor underlying the whole process, the all-inclusive unity in which it is embraced, and in a sense the goal it seeks, is the Absolute who constantly strives toward more complete espression of His inexhaustibly magnificent potentialities. 49 At times the Hegelian Absolute seems to resemble the impersonal All of Spinoza's pantheism, but Hegel's emphasis upon Reason and Purpose points rather to a personal Absolute.

(iv) Lotzean idealism, as previous discussion has indicated, 50 regards personality as the fundamental reality, and teaches that God is the good and personal Creator of the cosmos. Lotze has exerted a profound influence upon modern personalistic idealism.

(v) Modern idealism holds to a belief in God, the

<sup>45.</sup> Hegel, POM, I, 16. 46. <u>Ibid</u>., II, 16. 47. <u>Ibid</u>., II, 327-329.

<sup>48.</sup> Hegel, POH, 34-35. 49. Ibid., 101.

<sup>50.</sup> Supra, 18.

Supreme Person and the Creator of a society of persons other than Himself, "so that the universe is ultimately a society of selves, not a single self."51 The universe exists through the creative act of the will and purpose of the one Supreme Person or Mind: "God is absolute will or absolute agent, forever determining himself according to rational and eternal principles."52 The moral nature of man, as experienced, inspires faith in the moral goodness of God. "The facts neither compel nor forbid this faith. They permit it, and to some extent illustrate it."53 Mind and values are supreme "in the eternal processes of all being."54

### ii. Definition of Idealism

Some philosophers have felt that idealism is perhaps not the best term for the great philosophic system it designates. Hocking thinks that spiritualism or mentalism would be more exactly definitive. 55 Sellars is inclined to use idealism and spiritualism synonymously, explicitly stating that he considers spiritualism the better expression because "idealism has come to be identified in exact philosophy with epistemological idealism," and also because

<sup>51.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 246.

<sup>52.</sup> Bowne, <u>Theism</u>, 198. 53. <u>Ibid.</u>, 249.

<sup>54.</sup> Brightman, NV, 91. 55. Hocking, TOP, 248.

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it has been associated too much with "ethical and religious idealism, that is, with eulogistic attitudes, to serve as a technical metaphysical expression."<sup>56</sup> However, as Hocking observes, spiritualism, too, "has been drafted to other uses."<sup>57</sup> OM the whole, generally accepted usage seems to sustain the view that the "term idealism is so embedded in the history of philosophy that attempts to eradicate it are probably destined to failure."<sup>58</sup>

Brightman says that "it would be safer to admit that it is impossible to define the generic term <u>idealism</u> with precision," and proposes what he calls "a vague working definition:"

All idealism is characterized by belief in the ultimate reality or cosmic significance either of mind (using the term in the broadest sense) or of the ideals and values revealed to and prized by mind.

Idealism is the theory which holds that reality is of the nature of mind or consciousness, and that values are objective. If the term <u>mind</u> is construed in the broad sense of the psychical, this definition is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all types of idealism, including Bradley's idealistic conception of reality in terms of a unity of experience.

<sup>56.</sup> Sellars, PPP, 192.

<sup>57.</sup> Hocking, TOP, 249.

<sup>58.</sup> Brightman, POI, 172.

<sup>59. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>.

Wilbur Long's definition is similar and somewhat more detailed. He writes that idealism is

any system or doctrine whose fundamental interpretative principle is ideal . . . emphasizing mind (soul, spirit, life) or what is characteristically of pre-eminent value or significance to it. . . . Idealism stresses the supra- or non-spatial, non-pictorial, incorporeal, suprasensuous, normative, or valuational, and teleological. O

Because the idealistic view regards the intrinsic nature of reality as consciousness or mind, idealism has often been confused with solipsism. Actually there is no basis for the confusion. Sheldon clarifies the distinction thus:

Idealism . . . which is confessedly monistic, need not be subjective; acknowledged idealists deny the reduction of the world to a phase of one's mind. . . The differentia of idealism from subjectivism is the belief in a Great Mind who is more than any of us; subjectivism fixes upon the private mind as the last term of metaphysics. 61

Schopenhauer, for example, seems close to solipsism in passages such as the opening sentence in <a href="The World as Will and Idea">The World as Will and Idea</a>:

"The world is my idea"--this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. 62

<sup>60.</sup> Long, art. (1942).

<sup>61.</sup> Sheldon, SSPD, 43.

<sup>62.</sup> Schopenhauer, WWI, I, 3.

But Schopenhauer is not a solipsist, for he believes that beyond nature is the Idea, the Will, which produces it. 63 Leibniz and Berkeley, too, have been mistakenly looked upon as solipsists, but solipsism is inconsistent with the view, held by both, that finite minds and nature are dependent upon a Supreme Mind.

All in all, there appears no justification for the misconception which identifies idealism and solipsism, for idealism is clearly distinguished by the fundamental belief in a Supreme Mind which is beyond nature and is greater than any finite mind.

### iii. Main Traits of Idealism

The main traits of idealism may be briefly set forth as follows: (1) Idealism is characterized by the philosophical method of synopsis. 64 (2) Idealism seeks the holistic goal of a coherent interpretation of <u>all</u> of experience. 65 (3) For idealism, being is activity. 66 (4) Idealism holds that consciousness, or mind, is the ultimate explanation of the universe, 67 and hence is the alternative to materialism. 68

<sup>63.</sup> Schopenhauer, WWI, I, 169; II, 175; III, 220.
64. Brightman, ITP, 122, 237.
65. Ibid., 66, 252, 356.
66. Bowne, MET, 31, 339.
67. Bowne, MET, 149, 243, 354; Theism, 148, 173; Brightman, POI, 172.
68. Long, art.(1942).

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(5) Idealism views the universe as an expression of cosmic purpose. 69 (6) Idealism believes that values possess an objective status in the structure of the universe. 70

Idealism is the speculative view of those philosophers who, seeking a knowledge of all things in their ultimate causes, affirm that mind, or the spiritual and ideal, is of basic importance in reality. The idealist clings to the hypothesis that human reason is not a chance spark produced by the clash of blind forces, but a distinctive attribute of man who is purposely created by God. He asserts that

mind, spirit, or personality is the real energy of the universek and that concern for values and their development in every conscious being is at the root of every natural process, all life, all evolution, the entire cosmos.71

For the idealist, human reason is the divine gift empowering man to grasp with Plato the concept of a Supreme Reason inherent in the constitution and functioning of the universe; 72 ideals and values do not inhere solely in man, but endure eternally as "an essential part of the objective structure of the universe." 73

<sup>69.</sup> Bowne, MET, 248-257; <u>Theism</u>, 82; Brightman, NV, 62, 63; Brightman, ITP, 313-315.

<sup>70.</sup> Bowne, Theism, 173; Brightman, ITP, 149-165, 354; Brightman, ML, 285-287; POI, 211.
71. Brightman, NV, 90.

<sup>72.</sup> Plato, <u>Laws</u>, X, 897C. 73. Brightman, ML, 286.

### 2. Materialism

- i. Brief Survey of the History
- (1) Origin and Development. Materialism, like idealism, traces its history to Greece of the fourth and fifth centuries B.C., the era of Plato, the great idealist, and of Democritus, the first important materialist. Democritus propounded the theory that all things are composed of imperceptibly small, indivisible particles called atoms, the "finest, smoothest, most agile atoms" constituting the mind. rialism has worn many garbs, but all forms of materialism and naturalism find their source, their ultimate principle of explanation, in the Democritean precept: "Only the atoms and the void are real."75 although the conception of the nature of the atom has been revolutionized by modern science.

Epicurus accepted Democritus' atomism and taught that happiness and pleasure are the natural aim of life. 76 Since "Nature leads every organism to prefer its own good to every other good, "77 pleasure is the only conceivable end of life and action. Epicurus particularly emphasized the materialistic thesis that all things are produced by natural causes, and require no supernatural explanation.

<sup>74.</sup> Winn, árt. (1942). 75. Democritus, "The Fragments," in Bakewell, SAP, 60. 76. Winn, ibid.

<sup>77.</sup> Zeller, OGP, 112.

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In De Natura Rerum, Lucretius sets forth a ruthless materialism. Nothing exists save atoms, space, and law, and the fundamental law is that of evolution and dissolution everywhere. Soul and mind are composed of the smallest atoms, are evolved with the body, and die with the death of the body. 78 It was through Lucretius' De Rerum Natura, called by Professor Shotwell "the most marvelous performance in all antique literature,"79 that the influence of Democritus was transmitted until the Renaissance when scholars again turned to the study of nature. 80

Thomas Hobbes, inspired by Bacon's conception of the universe in Democritean mechanical terms, developed his thorough-going materialism and uncompromising atheism. held that the only subject matter of philosophy is found in bodies and their movements, and that "consciousness . . . is a jarring of the nervous system. 81

The German Baron Paul d'Holbach, a prominent materialist and one of the Encyclopedists, was the author of Le système de la Nature, known as "the Bible of Atheism."82 The work is an elaborate system of materialistic metaphysics.

Everything is explained by matter and motion, as

<sup>78.</sup> Thilly, HOP, 101.

<sup>79.</sup> Shotwell, IHH, 109.

<sup>80.</sup> Winn, art. (1942). 81. Fuller, art.(1942). 82. Winn, ibid.

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the effect of necessary laws. There is no soul; thought is a function of the brain; and matter alone is immortal. The human will is strictly determined; there is no design in nature nor outside of nature, no teleology and no God.

This epitome of the materialistic point of view, is, at the same time a point-by-point denial of the basic idealistic beliefs.

The dialectical materialism of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels is a philosophy which holds that the observable world of nature is real in its own right "without reservations;" there is no transcendental or supernatural cause; mind is an outgrowth of matter. This materialism is regarded as dialectical in that all things are viewed as interconnected by universal and radical change, for every existence is a complex of opposing elements which are constantly changing each thing into something else. 84

(2) Modern Conception of Materialism: Naturalism. traditional materialism, modern naturalism "is firmly directed against all philosophical idealism, theism, or personalism."85 Unlike traditional materialism, modern naturalism disavows the pre-"nineteenth-century-physics" concept of the impenetrable, indivisible, eternal atom. The electro-magnetic

<sup>83.</sup> Thilly, HOP, 387.

<sup>84.</sup> Somerville, art.(1942). 85. Brightman, NV, 83.

theory of modern physics shattered this age-old view. Discussing these "revolutionary changes," Eddington writes:
"Whatever further changes of view are in prospect, a reversion to the substantial atom is unthinkable." Atoms are no longer regarded as solid; they are looked upon as fields of force. Upon this contribution of modern science, recent naturalists have developed their system, and have come to look upon existence as activity.

### ii. Definition of Materialism

Materialism is the philosophical system which stands opposed to idealism. Materialism regards matter as the only reality, and endeavors to explain all existence in terms of the blind activity of matter.

Eisler's definition of <u>materialism</u> stresses the materialistic belief in the sole existence of the corporeal. He writes:

Materialismus heisst die Zurückführung alles Seienden auf Materie, alles Geschenens auf physysche, materielle Prozesse, des Geistes, der Seele, des Psychischen auf Körperliche Funktionen. Für den M ist alles Seiende, Wirkliche materiell, körperlich, etwas Immaterielles, Unkorperliches gibt es nicht.

Brightman, too, finds the core of materialism in the "theory

<sup>86.</sup> Eddington, NPW, 3. 87. Eisler, HDP, s.v. "Materialismus."

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that <u>matter</u> and its laws are all that there is or explain all," 88 and he amplifies this statement in another passage which says that materialists

hold that unconscious matter or some collection of unconscious immaterial entities or unconscious energy is the basal reality and the unconscious source of all life, mind, and values.


Lalande, also, points out the same idea as the central materialistic thesis, and quotes Wolff on the subject: Materialism is here defined as the

doctrine d'après laquelle il n'existe d'autre substance que la matière, à laquelle on attribue des propriétés variables suivant les diverses formes de matérialisme, mais qui pour caractère commun d'être conçu comme un ensemble d'objets individuels, representables, figurés, mobiles, occupant chacun une région determinée de l'espace. "Materialistae dicuntur philosophi, qui tantummodo entia materialia sive corpora existere affirmant." (Wolff, Psych. ration., 33.)

In Runes there is a similar interpretation of materialism, with particular emphasis upon the denial of an intelligent First Cause. "Only matter is existent or real" and it is the "primordial or fundamental constituent of the universe." The ultimate cause is not intelligent nor purposeful; nothing supernatural exists; all is explained

<sup>88.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 388.

<sup>89.</sup> Brightman, NV, 91. 90. Lalande (ed.), VDP, s.v. "Matérialisme."



solely by material, nonmental entities "having certain elementary physical powers."91

### iii. Main Traits of Materialism

The main traits of materialism, which are directly opposed to those of idealism, may be listed as follows: (1) Materialism is rooted in the scientific method of analysis. 92 (2) Limited by method, materialism is restricted to the "only objects science can investigate which are the physical or material (that is, public, manipulable, nonmental, natural, or sensible."93 (3) Traditional materialism held that ultimate reality consists of particles extended in space: 94 modern materialism, generally known as recent naturalism, believes that all reality is of the nature of energy. 95 (4) For materialism, "everything is explainable in terms of matter in motion, or matter and energy, or simply matter (depending upon the conception of matter entertained). 96 (5) Traditional materialism attributes the development of the universe to mechanism, the automatic functioning of matter in motion; recent naturalism. to evolution; both exclude all forms of supernaturalism. 97

<sup>91.</sup> Keeton, art. (1942).

<sup>92.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 24.

<sup>93.</sup> Keeton, <u>ibid</u>.
94. Neilson, (ed.), WNID, s.v. "materialism."
95. Jenkins, art.(1942); Krikorian (ed.), 288-289.

<sup>96.</sup> Keeton, ibid. 97. Feibleman, art. (1942).

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materialistic axiology is subjective: the greatest values that man can seek or obtain are "wealth, bodily satisfactions, sensuous pleasures, or the like."98

The discussion in this chapter has outlined the diametrical opposition between the two traditional systems of philosophical thought, idealism and materialism. Briefly, for idealism, mind is the ultimate reality; nature means physical nature, and mind, values, and universals stand outside nature; value, or goodness, is intrinsic to the very structure of the universe. Materialism denies these idealistic beliefs; for materialism, matter is the ultimate reality; nature means all existence, and caused by the blind activity of matter.

<sup>98.</sup> Keeton, art. (1942).

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#### CHAPTER III

### MAIN TRAITS OF RECENT NATURALISM

# 1. Definition of Nature

## i. Definitions in General

The term nature has a bewildering array of equivocal connotations. In Baldwin, there are listed some thirtyseven different meanings for the word. Rees' discussion of the term in Hastings requires fifty-three pages. Webster's New International Dictionary, in upwards of twelve hundred words, differentiates twelve distinct concepts conveyed by the noun. 2 Morrow opens his article in Runes by characterizing nature as "a highly ambiguous term."3 In Lalande. one is advised to avoid using the word because of its vagueness and ambiguity: "On doit éviter autant qu'on peut l'emploi de ce mot vague et ambigu." Eisler's Handworterbuch der Philosophie devotes more than sixteen hundred words to the definition of the term. 5 Dewey, asserting that "few terms in philosophy have a wider or looser use or involve greater ambiguity," points out that historically the word has been used with absolutely contrary implications, for

<sup>1.</sup> Rees, art. (1928).

<sup>2.</sup> Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "nature."
3. Morrow, art.(1942).

<sup>3.</sup> Morrow, art.(1942). 4. Mentré, art.(1926).

<sup>5.</sup> Eisler, HDP, s.v. "Natur."

example:

to mark off, in a most definite way, the world from God: and again to identify the world with God; and yet again to afford a connecting principle between God and details of the world.

In addition to the difficulties presented by the confusing mass of literature which has accumulated about this one word, there is a puzzling disinclination on the part of some writers about nature to define the subject of their discussion. A remarkable example of this failure to define is to be found in Nature, Man and God by William Temple, 7 although the purpose of the work is an investigation of nature. Likewise, John Oman, in The Natural and the Supernatural<sup>8</sup> offers no specific definition of his field of study. Nor is there a definition available in James Orr's The Christian View of God and the World, although a consideration of nature would seem to be a necessary part of any treatise about the world. Among the naturalists themselves, who might be expected to be particularly lucid regarding their crucial concept, vagueness and obscurity seem to be the hall-marks of their treatment of this term.

Despite the ambiguities, and despite much indifference

<sup>6.</sup> Dewey, art.(1940).
7. Temple, NMG: cited by Brightman in NV, 32.

<sup>8.</sup> Oman, TNS: cited by Brightman in NV, ibid. 9. Orr, CGW: cited by Brightman in NV, 31.

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to clarification among authors, nevertheless, there is both historical and general usage to support a clear precise meaning of the word.

Etymologically, <u>nature</u> is derived from the Latin <u>nature</u> which is from <u>nasci</u>, to be born, and has reference to the production of things, to the idea of coming into being. Hence, it generally includes in its connotation the ideas of activity and energy with an implication of law and permanence. Etymology conveys the idea that <u>nature</u> means that which continuously produces life. But usage often mutilates etymological interpretations.

A long tradition sets forth two antithetical conceptions of <u>nature</u>. The principal ambiguity has been between <u>nature</u> understood as all of reality and as creative and active, and <u>nature</u> construed as the physical universe, created and passive.

The primitive ascribed the origin of life and action to nature as a whole. Plato made a sharp distinction between the perfect, true, ultimate reality consisting of transcendent universals, and the things of sense which are not completely real. He differentiated between the active formal element and passive material. In the <u>Laws</u>, the Athenian stranger says that the materialists

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Gods. Nearly all of them seem to be ignorant of the natura and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her origin; they do not know that she is among the first of things, and before all bodies, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions. 10


Aristotle, too, who is said to have "exercised greater influence upon western thought than any other single man."11 continued in his teaching the distinction between the Creator and the created. He held that God, the unmoved Mover and unchanging Cause is separate from Nature, the moved physical universe, which He caused to exist. 12 "God moves the world," he said, "as the beloved object moves the lover. 13

In pantheistic and naturalistic views, this antithesis between God and nature all but disappears. The influential pantheism of Spinoza, for example, views all reality as One Substance: Nature, Substance, and God are identival. Spinoza teaches that "no substance can be given or be conceived besides God;" and that "whatever is, is in God;"14 a passage from his correspondence reads:

I hold that God is the immanent, and not the extraneous, cause of all things, I say, All is in God;

<sup>10.</sup> Plato, <u>Laws</u>, X, 891. 11. Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "Aristotelianism." 12. Morrow, art.(1942).

<sup>13.</sup> Aristotle, Met., IX, 7. 14. Spinoza, Ethics, I, XIV, XV.



all lives and moves in God. 15

This doctrine of Spinoza's is the core of traditional pantheistic thought. Modern naturalism, also, regards nature as all of reality, 16 but with no immanent God as in Spinozean teaching.

There is an unnecessary vagueness and obscurity in the definition of nature as "everything" or as "all that there is." The definition does not define; it conveys no clear concept of the term beyond the meaning of all and everything, words used in a generally accepted sense. It seems arbitrary to establish as a superfluous synonym for all, the term nature, for which custom has established a specific meaning. In recognized usage, nature has been understood as designating a part rather than the whole of reality; nature has been taken to denote the world of sense objects, the world of matter in space and time. The word has been generally used in a sense restricted to the physical world and exclusive of the mental world. This signification is in expressions such as natural philosophy, natural history, and natural science, which deal only with the constitution, production, properties and laws of material substances.

<sup>15.</sup> Spinoza, Epistle 21.

<sup>16.</sup> Jenkins, art. (1942).

There is considerable recognized authority available supporting the definition of <u>nature</u> as specifically denoting the physical world. <u>Webster's New International Dictionary</u>, for example, includes the definition: "The system of all phenomena in space and time; . . . more narrowly, the totality of physical reality, exclusive of minds and the mental." Immanuel Kant, too, while necessarily distinguishing among various meanings, based his own fundamental concept of the word upon the distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of nature. He wrote that


die unbedingte Kausalität in der Erscheinung (heisst) die Freiheit; die bedingte dagegen heisst im engeren Verstande, Natursache.

And in another passage: "Natur ist das Desein der Dinge, sofern es nach allgemeinen Gesetzen bestimmt ist." Nature, for Kant, "is the object of all possible experience;" "possible" means logically consistent, and "experience means our sensations as ordered in space and time in accordance with such necessary principles as the law of cause and effect, which Kant calls categories." Thus, nature is the object of the senses, and the object of learning through

<sup>17.</sup> Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "nature."

<sup>18.</sup> Kant, KRV, A419.

<sup>19.</sup> Kant, Proleg., 14. 20. Brightman, NV, 36.



the senses. "The starry heavens above" are a part of nature for we learn of them through our senses, but "the moral law within" is not a part of nature for it is not known through the senses nor may it be investigated by the natural sciences. Kant and Webster sustain the general interpretation of nature as meaning the physical world.

Eisler, too, holds a brief for the specific definition.

His discussion of <u>nature</u> includes the following:

Natur bedeutet . . . den Gegensatz zum Geist, also den Inbegriff des sinnlich Wahrnehmbahren, des rein Objektiven, der materiellen Dinge und deren Eigenschaften und Relationen, der physikalisch-chemischen, anorganischen und organischen Prozesse, die Welt der Materiellen, Dynamisch-Energetischen, die Körperwelt, im Unterschiede von der Innenwelt, der Welt des Psychischen, des Seelenlebens, der Geistigkeit, des Bewussteins als solchen. 21


This passage from Eisler sets forth unmistakably the traditional antithesis between the physical and the mental, the term <u>nature</u> denoting the former concept. In Lalande, the same interpretation of the word is supported. For example,

Nature . . . s'oppose à l'Esprit, à Liberté, à Personalité. . . . (Le mot <u>nature</u>) designe le monde visible, en tant qu'il s'oppose aux idées, aux sentiments, etc. . . . Il designe l'univers, le monde materiel.

Kant has said that "philosophy teems with defective

<sup>21.</sup> Eisler, HDP, s.v. "Natur."

<sup>22.</sup> Lalande (ed.), s.v. "Nature."



definitions."23 a confusion which is increased by the lack of nice discrimination in defining nature as all that there The sciences of nature do not concern themselves with everything. They are equipped to investigate only observable data accessible to the senses; the publicly manipulable measures of the natural sciences cannot adequately investigate the richest areas of life, such as, the good, justice, truth, beauty, and holiness. "Sapientis est ordinare." It would contribute to that part of wisdom which is the ordering of knowledge, if clear-cut definitions of words were preserved so that all would know precisely the idea intended by the use of any word. It has been shown that recognized authorities as well as general usage define nature as the world of sense objects. This clear and distinct definition possesses definitiveness; it sharply marks off the meaning of nature from the meaning of all or everything. Also, this specific delimitation of meaning is analogous to the limitations of the objects of the natural sciences. Inasmuch as the term has preserved a respected particular and specific sense, it seems wiser to retain that meaning, rather than to contribute further to the teeming melee of "defective definitions."

<sup>23.</sup> Kant, CPR, B759, note.

# ii. Definition by Recent Maturalists

The volume entitled Naturalism and the Human Spirit has been called "Naturalism's most comprehensive manifesto."24 On the word of the editor, Yervant H. Krikorian, the contributors to this symposium are "primarily representative of naturalism."25 These representative naturalists look upon "contemporary naturalism . . . as a distinctively American philosophy"26 and they regard John Dewey as the leader of the movement. These naturalists tend to be more or less profuse in their recognition of Dewey's influence on their thought. A few of their characteristic acknowledgments may be mentioned: "The philosophy of John Dewey constitutes the vanguard of twentieth century naturalism."27 "The fortunes of the naturalistic principle in the twentieth century approximate a catalogue of the writings of John Dewey,"28 a statement which virtually identifies naturalism with Deweyism. Professor Larrabee speaks of "the signal services of Dewey" . . . as creator of "a major naturalistic system,"29 and Costello hails the Dewey view as " a force in American life."30 Professor Randall, in his article, "The Nature of

<sup>24.</sup> Brightman, NV, 102. 25. Krikorian (ed.), NHS, "Preface."


<sup>26.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>27.</sup> Lavine, art. (1944).

<sup>28.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29.</sup> Larrabee, art. (1944).

<sup>30.</sup> Costello, art. (1944).



Naturalism," is particularly articulate regarding the extent of Dewey's prestige among naturalists:

That John Dewey's lifelong preoccupation with scientific methodology has made his "experimental naturalism" the great inspiration of the present generation of naturalistic thinkers in this country, is obvious on almost every page of these essays. His concerns and problems touch the very heart of their own philosophic drive.


Outside the naturalistic fold, too, Dewey is regarded as the leading figure of the naturalistic movement. For example, in Vergilius Ferm's article entitled "Naturalism," John Dewey is the sole contemporary naturalist named. 32 Brightman, also, looks upon Dewey as the chief exponent of the naturalistic point of view. Outlining the age-old conflict between "materialists and idealists, or -- to use more modern terms--naturalists and personalists." Brightman writes:

In Greece there were Democritus and Plato; . . . In China were the idealists Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming and the primitivistic naturalist Chuang Tzu. In Rome, Lucretius wrote <u>De natura</u> rerum and Cicero wrote De natura deorum. In Germany the materialist Feuerbach opposed the idealist Hegel. In the America of today John Dewey is a great naturalistic leader and William Ernest Hocking is a great idealist.

In this highly selective roster of some twelve names

<sup>31.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>32.</sup> Ferm (ed.), EOR, 518. 33. Brightman, NV, 111.



typifying philosophical movements of some 2500 years, Dewey stands as the symbol of modern naturalism. There is, apparently, considerable justification for accepting Dewey's views as representative of the naturalistic position. As the dynamic focus of recent naturalism, and as "the only American about whom has been formed a regular philosophical school," Dewey is unique.

Regarding the definition of <u>nature</u>, a critical concept of naturalism, naturalistic authors are singularly lacking in precision and clarity. They say that <u>nature</u> is all of reality without explicitly specifying what they mean to include in the <u>all</u>, although, as this discussion will attempt to show, they implicitly state that they believe that the physical world is all of real existence.

Dewey himself sets the pattern for this vagueness about the meaning of <u>nature</u>; he says that he hopes that his philosophy "does not tell much about the environing world which is discovered." Nevertheless, a consideration of some of his assertions will disclose indications of his view.

The word <u>nature</u>, Dewey writes, denotes "perhaps the oldest of all formulated and general philosophical concepts,"

35. Schilpp, PJD, 533.

<sup>34.</sup> Cohen, art. (1921). This statement, however, overlooks at least Bowne, James, and Perry.

and modern thought has added no "essentially new ideas to the concept of nature." The modern contribution has been rather to set forth clearly

the homogeneity of nature, its identical structure and operation in all its parts, mundane and stellar, . . . a conception which more than any other is the philosophical idea underlying modern science.

The view here expressed is identical with that of traditional naturalism. Democritus, too, thought of nature as homogeneous when he said that "In reality there are only atoms and the void," the finest and smoothest atoms composing the human soul.

For Dewey, <u>nature</u> is a reality which, in all its parts, will yield to the importunities of science and to human control. Nature, he says,


ceases to be something which must be accepted and submitted to, endured or enjoyed, just as it is. It is now something to be modified, to be intentionally controlled.

Any attempt to "idealize and tationalize the universe at large," Dewey regards as deplorable, because it is a "confession of inability to master the course of things that specifically concern us." 38

<sup>36.</sup> Dewey, art. (1940).

<sup>37.</sup> Dewey, OFC, 100.

<sup>38.</sup> Dewey, IDP, 8.



Dewey specifically includes man in his conception of a homogeneous nature. "It is quite true," he says, "that in my whole philosophy I regard man as part of nature, "39 and he is equally explicit in expressing his view that both the mental and nonmental aspects of man are part of the "identical structure" of nature, a highly important naturalistic belief which will received detailed discussion in Chapter IV of this work. At this point, one selection from Dewey may serve to indicate his position; he writes, for example:

The intelligent activity of man is not something brought to bear upon nature from without; it is nature realizing its own potentialities in behalf of a fuller and richer issue of events.

In Dewey's view, then, nature is the totality of reality inclusive of mathematical and logical objects, values, 41 and of man in his entirety. It is homogeneous in character, "identical in structure and operation in all its parts:"42 is a temporal process43 and the proper object of the physical sciences. 44 Hence, Dewey's total reality, inclusive of mind, must be physical and material.


As previously intimated, the entire Krikorian volume

<sup>39.</sup> Dewey, art. (1934).

<sup>40.</sup> Dewey, QFC, 214. 41. <u>Ibid.</u>, 195.

<sup>42.</sup> Dewey, art. (1940).

<sup>43.</sup> Dewey, QFC, 234. 44. Dewey, art.(1940).



is, in a sense, a tribute to the thought of John Dewey.

Krikorian himself, in complete agreement with Dewey, unecuivocally sets forth his belief that nature is all of reality and is physical:

Nature is the whole of reality. . . . "Nature" means what empirical science finds it to be and what completed empirical science would find it to be. . . The matrix of life is physical. . . What is important is the fact that life must be interpreted and defined within the medium of mechanism. . . Living beings are through and through physico-chemical. 45

Krikorian's entire essay, "A Naturalistic View of Mind," constitutes an apology for the naturalistic belief that <u>nature</u> is all of existence, emphatically inclusive of mind as his title suggests, and that in character it is ultimately physical and penetrable by the methods of the natural sciences.


There are many expressions of the same view. Herbert W. Schneider, for example, puts it thus:

There is only one order of nature. . . . Things are natural in so far as they work, and working implies a mechanical continuum. . . . Nature is primarily a category of creation . . . the mother of mothers. . . . Nature has the same place in naturalistic philosophy that "reality" has in idealism. 46

Schneider says that the <u>nature</u> of naturalism is identical

<sup>45.</sup> Krikorian, art. (1944).

<sup>46.</sup> Schneider, art. (1944).



with the reality of idealism, and that it consists in a "mechanical continuum." The "reality" of idealism is "the whole of actual being: "47 and the word mechanical, according to Webster, refers to physical science. 48 Hence, Schneider's one order of nature mist be spatial or physical.

Similarly, John Herman Randall, Jr., in his essay, "The Nature of Naturalism." says:

For present-day naturalists "Nature" serves rather as the all-inclusive category, corresponding to the role played by "Being" in Greek thought, or by "Reality" for the idealists.

The philosophy of this writer has "put man and his experience squarely into the Nature over against which he had hitherto been set."50 Like Dewey, Randall is rigorously "opposed to all dualisms between Nature and another realm of being . . . to the fundamental dualism pervading modern thought between Nature and Man, "51 and he holds that this "all-inclusive category" of Nature may be known through the application of the scientific method. 52


Harold A. Larrabee has the same conception of nature

<sup>47.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 390.
48. Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "mechanical," "mechanics."

<sup>49.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>50.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. 52. <u>Ibid</u>.



and he, too, regards mind as a part of an all-inclusive physical nature. "There are no powers," he says, "prior to the existence of their organs or independent of them."53

Sterling P. Lamprecht says that "existence can be affirmed only of things within the spatial-temporal world," and he specifically places mind within that world. <sup>54</sup> Miss Lavine asserts the "continuity between the 'lower' and the 'higher,' between the 'physical' and the 'human,' between the 'biological' and the 'logical.' "55

The same interpretation of <u>nature</u> finds expression among the writings of outstanding naturalists who have not been included in the Krikorian symposium. Roy Wood Sellars, for example, looks apon nature as a self-sufficient system --"active, dynamic, relational and self-organizing,"56 as "identical with existence and reality,"57 and as physical. He writes:

Back of pomp and circumstance, back of love and beauty and tragedy and happiness, lies--matter. In short, the physical is but another term for being. 58

He "seeks to show how man is a part of the fabric of the


<sup>53.</sup> Larrabee, art. (1944).

<sup>54. -</sup>amprecht, art. (1944).

<sup>55.</sup> Lavine, art. (1944).

<sup>56.</sup> Sellars, art. (1944).

<sup>57.</sup> Sellars, art. (1934). 58. Sellars, PPR. 6.



world;"59 he refers to mind as a "physical category;"60 and he states that "That which is physical is real, and that which is real is physical. "61

In An Encyclopedia of Religion, Henry Nelson Wieman, who is also among the foremost naturalists, defines nature as "precisely the totality of all that is temporal and spatial together with whatever possibilities this temporal and spatial process may carry." Reality, he says, is what we experience, and experience


is impossible apart from space and time. In other words, experience is necessarily and essentially temporal and spatial. Therefore, anything that we can ever experience must be wome quality, form, or movement pertaining to temporal and spatial reality. Since nature includes all temporal and spatial reality together with all its possibilities, all that we can ever experience must be nature. 62

Iredell Jenkins, in an article in Runes' Dictionary of Philosophy, says that the basis of the naturalistic philosophical position is the belief that "the natural world is the whole of reality: " and that for the modern naturalist there is "but one system or level of reality . . and this system is the totality of objects and events in space and time. "63 Inasmuch as space and time

<sup>59.</sup> Sellars, PPR, 1. 60. Sellars, EN, 300.

<sup>61.</sup> Sellars, PPR, 13.

<sup>62.</sup> Wieman, art. (1945). 63. Jenkins, art. (1942).



pertain to physical objects, 64 Jenkins can mean only that all existence is physical.

The foregoing statements regarding nature from the pens of typical naturalists warrant the following comments: The concept nature is a basic idea in naturalistic philosophy. Nevertheless, many naturalists seem loath to be clearly explicit as to just what they mean when they employ the term nature, although upon the meaning of this word hinges their metaphysical conclusions. An analysis of their assertions, however, leads to certain inferences: (1) Naturalists believe nature to be the one original and fundamental source of all that exists. (2) Either explicitly or implicitly, these naturalists regard nature, the ultimate reality. as physical or material. (3) Although inclined to vagueness in connection with this basic principle, many naturalists are remarkably and emphatically specific in affirming that consciousness or mind are but manifestations of the biological organism, and are included in a nature which is physical through and through. On this point these naturalists are definite; they seem to dwell upon it resolutely. This reiterated insistence upon the inclusion of mind in nature is all the more extraordinary in that it is

<sup>64.</sup> Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "space," "time," "extension."

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redundant, for, to say that nature includes <u>all</u>, is necessarily to say that nature includes mind, mind being a part of all. However, the close attention to the problem of mind may be a healthy sign in naturalistic thought; it may stem from a persistent awareness among these conscientious and cogent thinkers that their monistic philosophy does not adequately explain the immediately experienced uniqueness of thought.


## 2. Definition of Naturalism

i. Definitions in General

As the word implies, <u>naturalism</u> designates the view that nature is all of reality. As would be expected, the confusion and ambiguity about the meaning of <u>nature</u> are maintained in the correlative word <u>naturalism</u>. S.D. Niven remarks upon "all the vagaries in its usage," and sums up "the revived and modern acceptation" as

a certain type of <u>Weltanschauung</u> which has had its upholders ever since the first rise of philosophy. It includes all types of theory which rule or try to rule out of consideration whatever is called "supernatural" or "spiritual" or transcendent of experience. It attempts to transcend materialism.

<sup>65.</sup> Niven, art. (1928).



In this brief definition, Niven has outlined some of the salient features of recent naturalism. He points out that it is not a new system of thought, but "revived" -- actually as old as the earliest philosophic theory. He takes note of the naturalistic denial of everything known as "supernatural" or "spiritual." Inasmuch as philosophical discussion embraces two orders of being, known as spiritual opposed to material, or as mind opposed to matter, or as supernatural opposed to natural, it follows that the specific denial of the one implies recognition only of the other. That is, Niven says negatively that, in his interpretation, naturalism is the belief that only the material has exis-In this connection, it is noteworthy that naturalism attempts to differentiate itself from materialism; Niven seems to suggest a question as to the success of this attempt.

In Webster there is a positive expression of the same interpretation of <u>naturalism</u>. It is defined as

the doctrine which expands conceptions drawn from the natural sciences into a world view, denying that anything in reality has a supernatural or more than natural significance; specif., the doctrine that cause-and-effect laws, such as those of physics and chemistry, are adequate to account for all phenomena, and that teleological conceptions of nature are invalid.

<sup>66.</sup> Meilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "naturalism."

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
The meaning of this definition hinges upon the meaning of "natural sciences." In generally recognized usage, the natural sciences comprise those sciences which deal with sensory data; they expressly do not include the sciences of "abstract mathematics, philosophy, or metaphysics." Hence, according to Webster, naturalism begins with the denial of all but sensory data; then, on this premise limited to the recognition of only material objects, it seeks to build a world view. Consistent with the premise, the naturalistic conclusion is that only material objects have reality: there is nothing immaterial or supernatural.

Under the heading "Naturalismus," Eisler gives a similar definition. He writes:

der metaphysische . . . Naturalismus betrachtet die Natur als Inbegriff materieller Objekte oder doch raum-zeitlicher, streng kausalgesetzmässig zusammenhängender Vorgänge--als die einzige oder die wahre Realität; das Geistige gilt hier als blosses Produkt der Natur, als durchaus abhängig von Naturgeschehen und von irgendeinem Übernatürlichen kann nicht die Rede sein. Alles ist in Bann der Naturgesetzlichkeit eingeschlossen, auch der Mensch. 68

Eisler, too, understands naturalism to be the belief that the only true reality is nature regarded as consisting of

<sup>67.</sup> Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "natural science," "physical science."



material objects or spatial-temporal events. Anything called "spiritual" is a derivative of these sensible objects; the "supernatural" is nonexistent. All real existence, "even man," is included in a physical nature.

In Lalande's philosophical dictionary, <u>naturalism</u> is defined as "la doctrine pour laquelle il n'existe rien en dehors de la Nature," and, as previously indicated, nature is "le monde matériel" as opposed " àl'Esprit, à Liberté, à Personnalité." To


Fuller, writing in Runes, is in accord with the foregoing authorities. He says that naturalism

holds that the universe requires no supernatural cause or government, but is self-existing, self-explanatory, self-operating, and self-directing, that the world-process is not teleological and anthropocentric, but purposeles, deterministic (except for possible tychistic events), and only incidentally productive of man; that human life, physical, mental, moral, and spiritual, is an ordinary natural event attributable in all respects to the ordinary operations of nature; and that man's ethical values, compulsions, activities, and restraints can be justified on natural grounds without recourse to supernatural sanctions.71

These recognized authorities apparently are in agreement regarding the core of the naturalistic position. They

<sup>69.</sup> Lalande (ed.), VDP, s.v. "Naturalismus."
70. Ibid., s.v. "Nature."

<sup>71.</sup> Fuller, art. (1942).



define it as the belief that all of reality resides in physical nature, a view trenchantly summarized as the "theory that physical nature (matter and its laws) is all that there is or is a sufficient explanation of all."<sup>72</sup>

ii. Definitions by Recent Naturalists


On the dust jacket of Krikorian's work, the publisher comments that "there are almost as many definitions of <u>naturalism</u> as there are writers of essays in this volume," and one of these writers, S.T. Lamprecht, says that

the term "naturalism" is ordinarily used very vaguely and perhaps has no established meaning that all who dub themselves naturalists would agree to accept. 73

However, as would be expected in a philosophy so thoroughly permeated by the thought of one man, these naturalists are in accord concerning several basic issues of their system. Krikorian, in his preface, says that the "common agreements, not so much in specific ideas as in general attitudes" are apparent throughout the essays. 74 Randall feels that naturalists, despite their differences, may "lay lay claim to "a position which both negatively and positively is not lacking in precision . . . and to a community

<sup>72.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 338.

<sup>73.</sup> Lamprecht, art.(1944). 74. Krikorian (ed.), "Preface."



of temper, of method, and of general outlook."<sup>75</sup> The agreements are revealed as the important basic beliefs which determine the naturalistic metaphysics.

Dewey sets the pattern for the foundation of naturalism: he says it is the


the theory that the whole of the universe or of experience may be accounted for by a method like that of the physical sciences, and with recourse only to current conceptions of physical and natural science; more specifically, that mental and moral processes may be reduced to terms and categories of the natural sciences. It is best defined negatively as that which excludes everything distinctly spiritual or transcendental. 76

This excerpt provides the key for naturalistic thought: it is an unqualified faith that "a method like that of the physical sciences" is the sole and absolute source of any knowledge. Dewey means to include every area of knowledge thus far attempted by man, for he specifically mentions the universe, experience, moral processes—that is, values—and mind or soul, and he states that all these are explicable by the natural sciences. Inasmuch as the objects of the natural sciences are by definition sensory data, 77 every existent is, in Dewey's view, reducible to sensory data. In

<sup>75.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>76.</sup> Dewey, art. (1940).

<sup>77.</sup> Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "natural science."



the last sentence of the above-quoted passage, Dewey reaffirms his belief that only sensible objects have ultimate reality in his denial of everything "spiritual," that is, of everything "not material; incorporeal." Dewey's definition of <u>naturalism</u> is consistent with his conception of an all-inclusive, homogeneous nature.

Krikorian's definition notes the same fundamental tenets of naturalistic thought. He writes:


For naturalism as a philosophy the universal applicability of the experimental method is a basic belief... The naturalist must proceed with the belief that mental phenomena, like all other phenomena, can be understood by means of the experimental method... Still another basic belief that is characteristic of naturalism is that nature is the whole of reality... The naturalist turns away from supernatural worlds. For him there is no supernature, no transcendental world. 79

Krikorian describes the experimental method as objective, and his discussion shows that by "objective" he means to refer to sensory objects. In according unlimited application to the method of sensory data, he implies that the "whole of reality" is sensible or physical; he pointedly includes mind in the <u>all</u> which is physical nature; and, consistently, he rejects everything supernatural.

Miss Lavine expresses the same point of view. In her

79. Krikorian, art. (1944).

<sup>78.</sup> Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "spiritual," "material," "corporeal," "matter."



essay, "the principle of continuity" is called "the nerve of the naturalistic position," and it requires that the scientific method be employed in the "investigation into all problems in all subject matters." She believes that

Naturalism has no essential tenets beyond the principle of continuity of analysis. . . . "Continuity" of analysis can . . . mean only that all analysis must be scientific analysis. 80

Lamprecht gives no specific definition, but his article sets forth his philosophy as founded upon the belief that all existence is the proper object for investigation by the natural sciences.<sup>81</sup>

W.R. Dennes sums up the naturalistic position thus:


Contemporary naturalism recognizes . . . that the distinction from other philosophical positions lies in the postulates and procedures which it criticizes and rejects rather than in any positive tenets of its own about the eosmos. . . It leaves to ordinary scientific observation and inference all questions as to what the patterns and processes in the world probably are. Its spirit in these respects is very close to the spirit of traditional and more specifically materialistic naturalism. Both are protests against all philosophies which allege that events require, for their explanation, reference to transcendental grounds, orders, causes, purposes, Dinge an sich, or the like.

Here again is the assertion that the pivotal conviction of

<sup>80.</sup> Lavine, art. (1944).

<sup>81.</sup> Lamprecht, art. (1944).

<sup>82.</sup> Dennes, art. (1944).



naturalistic thought is faith in the scientific method as the exclusive avenue to knowledge, with the logically necessary denial of everything above or beyond those things manifest to the senses. Dennes goes so far as to remark frankly upon the materialistic character of this naturalism.

Wieman asserts that the basis of naturalism is "a certain method of inquiry" the data of which consist in "anything that can be experienced. He claims that knowledge is attainable only

by discovering how events (happenings) are related to one another, or how they might possibly be related. Therefore, all the reality we can ever know must be made up of interconnected happenings and their possibilities. . . . Naturalism holds that all actual reality is necessarily temporal and spatial.


He places the basis of naturalism in method, and he views all reality as temporal and spatial, that is, physical.

Sellars has developed an "evolutionary naturalism" which he calls a "reformed materialism:"

It goes without saying that I am not seeking to resurrect an outmoded type linked inseparably with an outgrown form of physics, Democritean or classical. No; it must be a reformed materialism which is philosophically and scientifically sophisticated.

<sup>83.</sup> Wieman, art. (1945).

<sup>84.</sup> Sellars, art. (1943.



Sellars, too, stresses the significance of science as the sole determinant of philosophical conclusions, which, he believes, must change to accord with advancing scientific knowledge. This view is identical with Dewey's idea that the universe is comprehensible "with recourse only to current conceptions of physical and natural science."

Certain facts emerge from a consideration of these definition of naturalism. Implicit in the naturalistic concept of nature is the definition of naturalism accepted both by recognized general authorities and by representative naturalistic sources. Naturalism may be defined as the doctrine that physical nature constitutes all of reality including mind. The naturalists themselves are dogmatic in holding that all knowledge derives from the method of the natural sciences; the crux of the naturalistic philosophy is this uncualified belief in the exclusive validity of the scientific method as the sole source of all knowledge and truth. From their unvarying adherence to this crucial principle follows their repudiation of everything extramaterial, that is, of all that is known as mental or spiritual or supernatural or transcendental.

## 3. Definition of Supernaturalism


i. Definitions in General

Etymologically, the word <u>supernatural</u> is derived from the Latin forms <u>super</u>, above, and <u>natura</u>, nature, and this etymological meaning is maintained in the generally accepted meaning of the term. In Webster, <u>supernatural</u> is defined thus:

Of, belonging or having reference to, or proceeding from, an order of existence beyond nature, or the visible and observable universe; divine as opposed to human or spiritual as opposed to material; as . . . the <u>supernatural</u> character of the soul. . . . Ascribed to agencies or powers above or beyond nature or based upon such an ascription; brought about, initiated, made operative, etc., by means that transcend the laws, or observed sequences of nature. 80

This definition presupposes the usage of <u>nature</u> in the specific sense of reference to the physical world, and not in the naturalistic sense of reference to all of reality. Webster's intention to differentiate clearly between the <u>natural</u> and the <u>supernatural</u> is apparent in his treatment of <u>nature</u> as synonymous with the "visible or observable universe," an expression which can mean only sensory objects accessible to more than one knower; and in his affirmation

<sup>86.</sup> Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "supernatural."



of two orders of being, the "spiritual as opposed to material," and not only one order as postulated by the naturalists; and in his particularization of the "character of the soul" by the term <u>supernatural</u>, thereby implying the traditional distinction of the soul from things which are <u>natural</u> or <u>copporeal</u> or <u>physical</u>. The entire definition indicates a taken-for-granted recognition of an order of existence other than that of nature.


Accordingly, Webster defines supernaturalism as

any doctrine or creed that asserts the reality of an existence beyond nature and the control and guidance of nature and men by an invisible power or powers. 87

This definition goes further than the preceding one in that it asserts a reality beyond nature and imputes a controlling power to an invisible being.

Other authoritative sources present the same interpreof <u>supernaturalism</u>. Eisler defines <u>Supernaturalismus</u> as
"der Glaube an eine übernatürliche Offenbarung," and <u>übernatürlich</u> he places in contradistinction to <u>natürlich</u>; the
word <u>Offenbarung</u> suggests the added idea of <u>revelation</u> or
<u>manifestation</u>, which, however, could be understood as

<sup>87.</sup> Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "supernaturalism."
88. Eisler, HDP, s.v. "supernaturalismus;" "übernatürlich."



implicit in Webster's statement.

In Lalande, supernaturalisme is said to be a "croyance à des faits surnaturels," and surnaturel is defined as "Qui est au-dessus de la nature, " nature, as noted in previous discussion, being "l'ensemble des êtres connus par les sens. 1189

Guthrie says that the supernatural is that which "surpasses the active and exactive powers of nature."90 Similarly, Professor Ormond understands supernaturalism as the

doctrine that the world, including man, is to be referred, in the last analysis, to a being who in his nature and power transcends the world and cannot be identified with its forces and operations. 91


All these authorities convey the same interpretation of supernaturalism as being the doctrine which asserts a reality which transcends the recognized powers of physical nature.

## ii. Naturalistic Concept

Dewey provides the pattern for the naturalistic conception of supernaturalism. He simply denies the existence of anything beyond nature. In saying that "the whole of the

<sup>89.</sup> Lalande (ed.), VDP, s.v. "supernaturalisme;" "surnaturel;" "nature:"
90. Guthrie, art.(1942).

<sup>91.</sup> Ormond, art. (1940).



universe" may be explained by the natural sciences, he implicitly rejects any reality beyond nature. But regarding this point Dewey is explicit. He says that naturalism is "best defined" as a system which repudiates everything "spiritual or transcendental:"92 he decries the "encumbrances" of supernaturalism and looks forward to "emancipation" from them. 93 In his view, the supernatural is nonexistent.


This doctrine of a denial of everything known as supernatural or spiritual is a persistent and characteristic theme in the thought of these recent naturalists. Costello says, "There is no 'supernatural.'"94 Sidney Hook writes that "the naturalist denies the existence of supernatural powers. . . . Naturalism is opposed to all known forms of supernaturalism."95 Randall quotes and applauds Dewey's assertion that naturalism has "no place for 'spirit' and 'spiritualism,'" and declares further that naturalism is "in fundamental opposition to all forms of supernaturals. ism."96 Krikorian states that "the naturalist turns away from these supernatural worlds. For him there is no supernature, no transcendental world."97 Larrabee asserts that

<sup>92.</sup> Dewey, art. (1940).

<sup>93.</sup> Dewey, QF, 2. 94. Costello, art.(1944).

<sup>95.</sup> Hook, art. (1944). 96. Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>97.</sup> Krikorian, art. (1944).




"supernaturalism has overstayed its era,"98

Sellars, too, consistent with his view of nature as self-sufficient and independent, denies the supernatural. Believing that all reality is physical, he accords no reality to anything supernatural. 99 He urges that we "outgrow the false notions" pertaining to the supernatural, 100 for the existence of which there is lack of evidence. 101

The two opposed conceptions of nature discussed in the first section of this chapter lead to the two positions regarding supernaturalism. On the one hand, those who hold that nature means all of reality, must hold also that there is nothing beyond nature; for them the term supernatural is meaningless, or else it is synonymous with nothing. Logically, the all-inclusive definition of nature could embrace within the natural, all that has ever been meant by supernatural; actually, as will be shown in Chapter IV, recent naturalists attempt this to a degree. On the other hand, those who believe that nature means the created part of reality, the physical universe, believe that above and beyond nature there is another order of existence which they call the supernatural.

<sup>98.</sup> Larrabee, art. (1944).

<sup>99.</sup> Sellars, PPR, 6. 100. Sellars, NSR, 7. 101. Sellars, RCA, 147.




- 4. Characteristic Features of Recent Naturalism
- i. Scientific Method: Crux of Naturalistic Thought The definitions of naturalism already discussed disclose that the nucleus of naturalistic philosophy consists in an undeviating faith in the sole and exclusive validity of scientific method as the criterion of truth and knowl-The definitions by the naturalists, already noted, invariably include assertions of this absolute reliance upon the natural sciences: for example, Dewey's theory that "current conceptions of physical and natural science" provide an adequate explanation of all of reality; 102 or Krikorian's declaration that everything "can be understood by means of the experimental method," by which, his discussion reveals, he means sensory data; 103 or Miss Lavine's statement that "all problems in all subject matters" should be investigated by the scientific method; 104 or Lamprecht's referral of all questions concerned with ultimate reality to "ordinary scientific observation and inference."105

The writings of recent naturalists insist upon this pivotal naturalistic principle. It is an unfailing point of emphasis throughout the Krikorian volume. Frofessor Randall.

<sup>102.</sup> Dewey, art. (1940).

<sup>103.</sup> Krikorian, art. (1944). 104. Lavine, art. (1944).

<sup>105.</sup> Lamprecht, art. (1944).



having stressed the fundamental importance of the scientific method in his own view, points out that

the insistence on the universal and unrestricted application of scientific method is a theme pervading every one of these essays. 106

"theme:" "The naturalism of these younger men is nothing if not scientific method critically aware of its assumptions and implications," 107 is a statement which represents naturalism and scientific method as virtually equivalent. Naturalism, it is said, stands or falls "with its acceptance of a strictly empirical method and its refusal to believe a matter of great moment when no evidence can be found." 108

"There is for naturalism no knowledge except that of the type ordinarily called 'scientific." "Naturalism . . . is based on modern scientific methods." 110 "A naturalistic approach involves . . . designation of empirical material . . . and continued testing in terms of this material," and


insistence on such testing is part of the naturalistic stress on the primacy of matter. . . . Reliance on scientific method, together with an

<sup>106.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>107.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108.</sup> Lamprecht, art. (1944).

<sup>109.</sup> Dennes, art. (1944). 110. Nagel, art. (1944).



appreciation of the primacy of matter and the pervasiveness of change, I take to be the central points of naturalism as a philosophic outlook. Ill


Of the three "central points" of naturalism mentioned in this excerpt, two derive from "reliance on scientific method," for scientific method can lead to a knowledge only of matter, an essential quality of which is the "pervasiveness of change." Naturalists in general apparently agree with Randall when he says that "contemporary naturalism is rooted in the natural sciences," and with Dewey when he writes that "There is but one method for ascertaining fact and truth, -- that conveyed by the word 'scientific.' "113"

The crucial significance of the scientific method in naturalistic philosophy makes the meaning of scientific method a primary issue. On this point there seems, at times, to be a tendency to obscurity in naturalistic writings. The insistence by naturalists that their method be extended even to objects such as mind and values, traditionally regarded as supersensible, suggests that possibly the meaning of scientific method may have been expanded to include, for example, the function of reason in the idealistic sense, and is not restricted to the investigation of

113. Dewey, CF, 33.

<sup>111.</sup> Edel, art. (1944).

<sup>112.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).



sensory data. Despite this seeming uncertainty, which will receive detailed treatment in Chapter IV, there is abundant evidence that naturalists construe scientific method as the method of the physical and natural sciences. Edel expresses value in terms of physics. 114 Dennis' "inductive inference" turns out to be physical in character, 115 as does Krikorian's interpretation of mind. 116 Lamprecht says that "the qualitative nature of a thing is what empirically it is found to be,"117 and, in Bertocci's phrase, empirical means "checkable-by-sense."118 Wieman declares that the naturalistic "method of inquiry" reveals that only events have actual existence, and that analysis shows an event to be "necessarily temporal and spatial, "119 that is, physical.


Dewey, too, is explicit regarding his meaning of the scientific method which he identifies with the experimental method. He asserts that "effective and integral thinking is possible only where the experimental method in some form is used, "120 and that "scientific procedure is actual knowing" as contrasted with other and inferior types, 121 for it provides "the sole dependable means of disclosing

<sup>114.</sup> Edel, art(1944).

<sup>115.</sup> Dennes, art. (1944).

<sup>116.</sup> Krikorian, art. (1944). 117. Lamprecht, art. (1944). 118. Bertocci, art. (1947).

<sup>119.</sup> Wieman, art.(1945). 120. Dewey, QC, 24; HWT, 99. 121. Dewey, QC, 85, 86.



the realities of existence. "122 He says that modern science is "a recognition that no idea is entitled to be termed knowledge till it has passed into such overt manipulation of physical conditions as constructs the object to which the idea refers."123 He holds that "the first requirement of scientific procedure [is full publicity as to materials and processes."124 The scientific method, he avers, is the procedure of "making hypotheses which are then tried out in actual experimental change of physical conditions."125 He disregards as "meaningless" whatever is "couched in terms of something not open to public inspection and verification," or to "common observation and description." 126 He accepts those matters which "are capable of being tested by empirical evidence, since they all refer to things that are observable," and he seeks statements "in veritable propositions . . . capable of empirical test," recognizing only the "interpretation which is empirically verifiable." He writes:


a public and manifest series of definite operations, all capable of public notice and report, distinguishes scientific knowing from the knowing carried on by inner 'mental' processes accessible only to introspection, or inferred by dialect from assumed premises. 127

<sup>122.</sup> Dewey, art. (1930).

<sup>123.</sup> Dewey, art. (1908).

<sup>124.</sup> Dewey, TV, 22.

<sup>125.</sup> Dewey, EAN, 155. 126. Dewey, TV, 10, 11. 127. Dewey, QC, 128, 129.




The foregoing discussion indicates that the crux of the naturalistic philosophy rests in the fundamental dogma of unqualified dependence upon the scientific method as the exclusive criterion of knowledge. Regarding the meaning of scientific method, there seems at times to be a lack of clarity stemming from the naturalists' insistence that their method be extended to areas, such as value, hitherto admittedly outside of the physical realm. However, this vagueness is dispersed, and scientific method stands forth as restricted to the sensible objects of the physical and natural sciences, a conclusion demanded by the naturalists' emphasis upon the necessity of conditions described as "overt manipulation of physical conditions," overt being defined as "open to view; public; apparent; manifest;"128 or described as requiring "full publicity as to materials and processes," and publicity means "open to the observation or view of all;"129 or described as "concrete" which is opposed to ideal; 130 or as "empirical," meaning "checkable-by-sense" 131 and defined thus in Runes: "In scientific method . . . Thaving reference to actuality, "132 while, in the same source, actuality is said to mean "existence in space and time." 133

<sup>128.</sup> Neilson (ed.), s.v. "overt."

<sup>129. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, s.v. "publicity:" "public." 130. <u>Ibid.</u>, s.v. "concrete." 131. Bertocci, art.(1947).

<sup>132.</sup> Feibleman, art. (1942).

<sup>133.</sup> Cairns, art.(1942).



In thus confining themselves to sensory data, naturalists give insufficient consideration to some of the most vivid and powerful experiences of life. They devote insufficient attention to the deeper aspects of personality, such as memory and anticipation, or purpose, or the incontrovertibly intuited idealywalues of truth, justice, goodness, and love; and they do not note that these ideal values, or the lack of them, formulate the ends of men's actions, while physical nature provides only the means. 133a They assign inadequate importnce to human character, and to the need of rational mastery of the will in the realm of choice, if science is to inure to the betterment and not to the destruction of mankind. They overlook that higher part of the universe into which "the further limits of our being plunte" . . . an altogether different dimension of existence from the sensible and "merely understandable" world . . . the source of most of our ideal impulses which possess us in "a way for which we cannot articulately account, "133b -- experiences infinitely less hollow than the findings of the physical and natural sciences. Naturalists, on the whole, have concentrated upon the area of life

<sup>133</sup>a. Brightman, NV, 47. 133b. James, VRE, 515-519. 133c. <u>Ibid.</u>, 500.

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susceptible to sensory verification, and have then denied reality to those experiences which transcend their preconceived criteria.

## ii. A Doctrine of Rejection

The naturalistic faith in the exclusive validity of the scientific method implies the corollary doctrine of rejection. This doctrine of rejection is an integral component of naturalistic philosophy, and is embedded either explicitly or implicitly in each of the definitions of <u>naturalism</u> discussed in the second section of this chapter.

Naturalists tend to be insistent and emphatic regarding this negative position of denial. Dennes, for example, as already noted, finds the distinctive mark of naturalistic philosophy "in the postulates and procedures which it rejects rather than in any positive tenets of its own." 134 Naturalists deny all that is extramaterial; hence, they dogmatically reject everything known as supernatural, transcendental, mental, or spiritual. for these concepts cannot be verified by the method of the natural sciences. Among the specific assertions by naturalists, previously mentioned, is Dewey's outright repudiation of all called "spiritual or

<sup>134. &</sup>lt;u>Supra</u>, 61.

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transcendental;" or Costello's statement that "there is no 'supernatural;'" or Randall's assertion that naturalism "stands in fundamental opposition to all forms of supernaturalism. "135

Krikorian sets forth the position unequivocally. He says that

the importance of the naturalist's belief that nature is the whole of reality lies not only in what it affirms but in what it denies. It denies what a philosopher like J. Maritain maintains: 'There is a spiritual, metaphysical order superior to external nature . . . above all mechanism and laws of the material world.' This order 'is no part of this universe . . . it rises above the created world, the sensible and the supra-sensible.' And above this order there is also the order of grace, and 'this is entirely supernatural.' The naturalist turns away from these supernatural worlds. 136


Here is a frank denial of everything "superior to external nature" or above the "laws of the material world."

Many naturalists are particularly specific regarding the elimination of God in their philosophy. Costello declares that "God and immortality are myths. . . . The naturalist exclaims, 'Thank God, that illusion is gone. 11137 Sidney Hook writes:

The existence of God, immortality, disembodied

<sup>135. &</sup>lt;u>Supra</u>, **67.** 136. Krikorian, art.(1944).

<sup>137.</sup> Costello, art. (1944).



spirits, cosmic purpose and design, as these have been customarily interpreted by the great institutional religions, are denied by naturalists for the same generic reasons that they deny the existence of fairies, elves, and leprechauns. 138

This is a wholesale repudiation of the great truths of the Christian religions, justified by Professor Hook "because no plausible evidence has been found to warrant belief in the entities and powers to which supernatural status has been attributed." By "no plausible evidence" Professor Hook means no "scientific evidence" of the existence of extrasensory perception. 139

Randall says that "there is no room for any Supernatural in naturalism -- no supernatural transcendental God and no personal survival after death."140

Lamprecht declares that "the existence of God in the sense of a person is an open possibility," and that theism is "a matter of great moment." He disagrees with those naturalists who


not infrequently have been prone to toss off the remark that the existence of God is quite unimportant one way or the other. 141

His essay, "Naturalism and Religion," is devoted to the

<sup>138.</sup> Hook, art. (1944).

<sup>139. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. 140. Randall, art.(1944).

<sup>141.</sup> Lamprecht, art. (1944).



thesis that lack of empirical warrant renders untenable the idea of the existence of God, and he concludes that religion should be taken "with a sense of humor."

John Dewey's article, "Antinaturalism in Extremis," called a "polemic" by Professor Randall, is dedicated to justifying the "fact that naturalism has no place for . . . 'spirit' and 'spiritualism.'" The justification carries "the battle into the heart of the enemy's camp" in that it consists largely in a singularly satirical attack on religion, coupled with the theme that supernaturalists display a "systematic disrespect for scientific method" to the point of denying "the findings of science when the latter conflict with any of the dogmas of their creed." Regrettably, Professor Dewey offers no specific instances of such denial of scientific achievement.

Sidney Hook assails "the two cardinal propositions of natural theology, namely, 'God exists' and 'Man has an immortal soul." He decries the "failure of nerve" which, it is said, reveals itself in "a conversion of the soul to God" and in the "belief that myth and mysteries are modes of knowledge," and which "exhibits itself as a loss of confidence

<sup>142.</sup> Dewey, art. (1944).

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in scientific method." He says that the naturalist who

is faithful to his method must assert that for every traditional conception of God, the weight of evidence so far is decidedly in the negative. 143

Because God does not reveal Himself within the limits circumscribed by scientific but finite minds, then, for naturalists, God does not exist. There is a striking tendency among naturalists to "toss off" God and religion by relegating them to the realm of "congenial but unverifiable myths masquerading as literal truths; "144 or of "myths and mysteries; "145 or of "ghosts and spirits, unicorns and dragons; "146 or of "fairies, elves, and leprechauns; "147 or of "a gingerbread castle on the other side of the moon." 148

Rejection of mind in the traditionally accepted sense of an immaterial entity, like rejection of the supernatural, is intrinsic to naturalistic thought and is emphasized in authoritative definitions of <u>naturalism</u> such as those discussed in the second section of this chapter. The naturalistic concept of mind is well epitomized by Dewey when he says that "mental and moral processes may be reduced to

<sup>143.</sup> Hook, art. (1944).


<sup>144.</sup> Larrabee, art. (1944).

<sup>145.</sup> Fook, art. (1944).

<sup>146.</sup> Schneider, art. (1944).

<sup>147.</sup> Hook, art. (1944).

<sup>148.</sup> Ibid.



terms and categories of the natural sciences; "149 and by other naturalists in statements such as "Mental phenomena like all other phenomena, can be understood by means of the experimental method." This naturalistic concept of mind as a part of an all-inclusive homogeneous nature will receive detailed attention in Chapter IV of this work, the point of emphasis here being the doctrine of rejection as an integral feature of naturalistic philosophy.

This doctrine of rejection consists in a general and persistent flat denial of all supersensible existence. Naturalists repudiate everything known as supernatural, spiritual, and transcendental. They disavow the existence of God, the reality of soul or mind save as a physical category, and the doctrine of immortality.


iii. Agreements and Divisions in Naturalistic Thought
Krikorian, in the preface of his work, calls attention
to the "common agreements, not so much in specific ideas as
in general attitudes" apparent throughout the essays.
Randall considers that naturalists in general possess "a
community of temper, of method, and even of general outl
look." He regards "a naturalistic method as the starting

<sup>149.</sup> Dewey, art. (1940).

<sup>150.</sup> Krikorian, art. (1944).

<sup>151.</sup> Krikorian (ed.), "Preface."

<sup>152.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).



as the starting point of genuine philosophizing," and he holds that "within a naturalistic framework there is room for distinctive emphases" at times becoming sharpened into philosophic issues which divide American naturalistic thought. 153

Ernest Magel writes of "many of the sharp divisions between professed naturalists," and asserts that

disagreements among those professing naturalism is not a source of embarrassment to them, since naturalism is not a tightly integrated system of philosophy. 154

H.A. Larrabee views naturalism as "the slow growth of an attitude rather than of a specific philosophical doctrine. He says that naturalists "may differ in many details . . . but they agree in "rejecting whatever is not verifiable by scientific method. 155

H.T. Costello asserts that "the new naturalism has at least one reductionist or liquidationist theory; "There is no 'supernatural.' . . . Otherwise I do not find any great unity among these new naturalists." 156


These statements by naturalists indicate that the first in importance of their "common agreements" is identical with

<sup>153.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>154.</sup> Nagel, art. (1944).

<sup>155.</sup> Larrabee, art. (1944).

<sup>156.</sup> Costello, art. (1944).



their basic belief in the exclusive validity of the scientific method. From this stems another common agreement, namely, the view of their system as "the slow growth of an attitude," or, as Miss Lavine puts it, in a period of formulation prohibitive of "an adequate account" at the present time. 157 This characteristic attitude of tentativeness is in accord with Dewey's conclusion that "the quest for certainty" is futile, because future scientific achievements may alter the "facts" of the moment.

However, naturalists do not adhere consistently to their principle of tentativeness. Curiously enough, it is with reference to their doctrines of negation--which could not possibly fulfill the conditions of scientific method--that they are utterly dogmatic and completely lacking in any hint of tentativeness. It would be difficult to imagine a more dogmatic statement than Costello's assertion: "There is no supernatural;" and it is all the more significant in that it is the sole point of unity which he finds among the recent naturalists. Such a position suggests the possibility that the primary goal of naturalism may be the disposition of God, the scientific method serving as a plausible instrument.

<sup>157.</sup> Lavine, art.(1944). 158. Costello, art.(1944).

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Nevertheless, naturalists dwell with remarkable certitude upon their negative tenets. Larrabee mentions the differing views among naturalists, and notes one point of agreement among them; their rejection of everything unverifiable by the scientific method. 159 As already pointed out, a salient point in the definitions of naturalism is the denial of everything supernatural, spiritual, or transcendental. In Hastings, for example, naturalism is defined as "ruling out" these concepts; 160 Webster says that they are "denied;"161 Ferm discountenances "recourse to supernatural sanctions; "162 Dewey asserts that naturalism "is best defined negatively as that which excludes everything distinctly spiritual or transcendental."163 Naturalists explicitly deny the existence of God, of cosmic purpose and design, of mind or soul, and of immortality. Their negative doctrine of rejection has been shown to be intrinsic to their philosophy and is regarded as a distinctive feature of their system.


The divisions among naturalists appear among the less basic aspects of their system, and in no way affect the rigidity of their decisive fundamental tenets. One of the

<sup>159.</sup> Larrabee, art. (1944).

<sup>160.</sup> Niven, art. (1944).

<sup>161.</sup> Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "naturalism." 162. Fuller, art.(1942).

<sup>163.</sup> Dewey, art. (1940).



most important divisions stems from two different approaches to man's scientific knowledge of Nature. The issue lies between the structuralists and the functionalists. For the structuralists, the setting of physical science is in physics; for the functionalists, physical science has a biological setting. For the structuralists, explanation is sought in the ultimate categories of mathematics and mathematical physics; for the functionalists, explanation is sought in the activities of living beings adjusting to their environment. "But in a deeper sense the reconciliation has already been effected" because the structuralists accept the theory of creative evolution.

The philosophies of physics have been forced by their own subject-matter--the field--to adopt temporal and functional categories similar to those the biological and social sciences had already derived from theirs. 164

Thus it appears that there has been a meeting of minds regarding the difference of opinion which "till the last decade seemed perhaps the most important division within naturalistic thought." 165

Another division among naturalists is a contemporary version of the same issue. It lies between those naturalists


<sup>164.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>165.</sup> Ibid.

 who "translate all issues into methodological terms" and those who explain all problems in the "language of experience." The essayist concludes that "in the last analysis . . . when sufficiently critical and sophisticated" the two positions "seem rather like alternative ways of construing the same fact. . . . There is little ultimate difference."

Professor Randall places the divisions in naturalistic thought in the proper perspective when he says that they exist "within a naturalistic framework." The "framework" may be viewed as the naturalists' undeviating faith in the exclusive validity of the scientific method, which constitutes the dogmatic determinant of all their philosophical conclusions. Their differences are revealed as relatively superficial; they are submerged in the unity of a universal adherence to their method, which, by definition, admits only sensible objects.

- 5. Comparison of Recent Naturalism with Traditional Materialism
  - i. Points of Departure
- (1) <u>Changed Concept of Matter.</u> Recent naturalism seeks to transcend materialism, a distinction regarded by Professor Randall as a characteristic mark of his philosophy.



He looks upon

the identification of 'naturalism' with the double protest, against nineteenth-century materialism as well as against supernaturalism and transcendental idealism . . . as the christening, if not the begetting of the 'new' or 'contemporary' naturalism. 166

Dewey, too, attempts to differentiate sharply between recent naturalism and traditional materialism. He severely criticizes those antinaturalists who, he says, erroneously identify

naturalism with 'materialism' and then employ the identification to charge naturalists with reduction of all distinctively human values, moral, aesthetic, logical, to blind mechanical conjunctions of material entities. 167

Dewey, apparently, is objecting to the traditional materialistic atomism. With Sellars, he is denying an "outmoded type linked inseparably with an outgrown form of physics."168


Similarly, Dennes views the distinction between naturalism and the older materialism as paralleling the changed concept of matter ensuing upon recent scientific investigation.

He writes that

materialism is a position for which there is no evidence, if by 'materialism' we mean the doctrine

<sup>166.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>167.</sup> Dewey, art.(1944). 168. Sellars, art.(1943).




that the ultimate constituents are extended, hard, more or less heavy, indestructible, and in motion. 169

Dennes, like Sellars, seems to admit to a broader meaning of materialism denoting a view not restricted solely to a concept contingent upon an exploded scientific theory, for both reject materialism only as it means the solid-atom theory.

In thus differentiating their position from that of the older materialists, the modern naturalists are consistently in accord with their ruling principle of reliance upon scientific method. The distinction consists in the changed concept of matter approved by current scientific research. The traditional materialists, with the scientists of their time, conceived matter as composed of indestructible particles; the recent naturalists, with the contemporary scientists, have discarded the old atom theory, and have substituted their conception of matter as active energy, explaining nature as a process of creative evolution. Professor Hook is explicit regarding this identification of naturalistic philosophy with scientific theory:

The differences between naturalists in the history of thought can be easily explained in terms of (1) varying conceptions of what fields and problems are amenable to scientific treatment and (2)

<sup>169.</sup> Dennes, art. (1944).




progressive refinements in the methods of inquiry themselves. 170

The view that naturalism transcends materialism is combined with emphasis upon a "striking shift in the basic categories . . . employed in naturalistic philosophy." In the essay, "The Categories of Naturalism", Professor Dennes presents a thoroughgoing analysis of this important aspect. When science regarded nature as an atomic "system of tiny billiard balls," 171 naturalism conformed by establishing matter, energy, and motion as the basic categories. With the current scientific explanation of creative evolution, naturalism adapts itself by "the recent shift in the basic categories . . . to events, qualities, and relations."

Dennes says that "one cannot <u>say</u> strictly what one means by 'event' or 'quality' or 'relation' . . . which contemporary naturalism takes to be the constituents of all that occurs, of all that exists." However, an event is anything which happens" and "nothing in the world" exists except "events and their qualities and relations."

That nothing goes on and no human argument implies, or even makes sense of, any notion that events require for their occurrence or for their explanation any grounds, controlling orders, laws, principles,

<sup>170.</sup> Dennes, art.(1944). 171. Randall, art.(1944).



causes, purposes, values which are anything more than further stretches of events. 172


The categories of traditional materialism possessed such attributes as "extended, hard, heavy, and in motion, as well as indestructible." The categories of recent naturalism, on the contrary, are conceived as entirely free from any specific attribute with the single exception of process; the qualities and relations of any "event" are left to science. The three basic categories designate "aspects of existence" and they always exist concomitantly; "no instance of any of these aspects exists apart from instances of other aspects."172a

The naturalistic category of event is a significant advance toward the idealistic concept of ultimate reality as activity. 172b The idealists, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Bowne, for example, assert that only the active is real: reality consists in action, in change. Leibniz, in his Monadology, teaches that reality is composed of active individuals, called monads, which function in "preconceived harmony;" "quod non agit, non existit."172c Berkelev held

<sup>172.</sup> Dennes, art. (1944).

<sup>172</sup>a. <u>Ibid.</u> 172b. For a further discussion of this point, see infra, 112 and 117.

<sup>172</sup>c. Supra, 14; Brightman, ITP, 116-119.



that only God, the Supreme Spirit, and finite spirits are real; that a spirit is an active, incorporeal, undivided entity; and that things exist only in the action of a perceiving spirit. P2d Bowne asserts that being is activity, P2e and that there is "no substantial nature, but only natural events. Paturalists and idealists agree in denying a core of being, and are in accord in viewing reality as active energy: Leibniz calls his center of energy a monad; Berkeley's active entity is termed a spirit; Bowne affirms the active to be the real; both Bowne and the recent naturalist look upon nature as a series of events. The passing of the indestructible solid atom has marked the disappearance of an impasse between idealism and naturalism.


Nevertheless, the categories of naturalism, like those of materialism, refer to sensory data. They name "sets of occurrences which are visible or audible or otherwise sensible."

If, for example, the concept of body is examined—a concept that was a basic category in earlier naturalism—the modern naturalist would ask: What do we observe, compare (including measuring) manipulate, and infer when we deal with bodies? What but configurations of qualities occurring and persisting (that is, more or less persistent) and standing in "spatial" relations to other occurrent configurations. 173

Both naturalist and materialist are concerned with the physical

<sup>172</sup>d. <u>Supra</u>, 15, 21. 172e. **S**upra, 24.

<sup>172</sup>f. <u>Infra</u>, 121. 173. <u>Dennes</u>, art.(1944).



object and investigates it in accordance with the currently accepted instruments of science; the recent naturalist is distinguished in that he verbalizes his findings in terms of the new categories.


In short, the distinction between recent naturalism and traditional materialism is found in the achievements of modern science, which conceives physical nature as ultimately constituted of active energy rather than of solid atoms. In conformity with this scientific development, recent naturalism has substituted the new categories of events, qualities, and relations for the former materialistic categories of matter, motion, and energy.

(2) Changed Concept of the Scientific Method. Recent naturalists believe that the new categories enable them to investigate adequately areas of being closed to the older materialists.

When nature was interpreted as "a purely mechanical system of tiny billiard-balls following the laws of dynamics," human life and mind were left outside nature, in an unintelligible situation.

Man's only relation with such a world must be exclusively mechanical; when the small billiard-ball hit him on the head, he could see stars.

. . . The varieties of human experience, religious, artistic, moral, even intellectual,



became quite literally supernatural -- they were in no sense natural processes. 174

The purely mechanical explanation did not lend itself to an interpretation of the teleological and logical concepts in human experience.

Stimulated by the evelutionists, the natural sciences extended their range to include every aspect of man's experience, interpreting all in terms of interaction between the organism and its environment. Mind came to be understood as a biological organism completely explained by behaviorism.

In the extension of scientific treatment to the new fields which the earlier Newtonian mechanics had been unable to handle satisfactorily, the concepts of science were naturally enlarged, and its methods generalized into a complex set of procedures and standards. 175

The new categories are regarded as important instruments for the extension of the scientific method to every realm known to man.

By making serious use of the category of quality,
... contemporary naturalism has freed itself
from the objection leveled against earlier naturalism, that it excluded from existence, or was
committed to neglecting in one way or another, any
qualities experienced or imaginable, including

<sup>174.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>175.</sup> Ibid.

those in which men delight as appects of the highest achievements of the arts, the sciences, and what Aristotle called the master-art of politics. 176

Contemporary naturalists believe, according to Dennes, that the new categorical terms permit an empirical interpretation "of concepts, hypotheses, laws, and evaluations developed in the natural sciences, in historical studies, and in aeshhetic and moral judgments."177

In connection with the attempt at the universal application of their method, these naturalists express a deep regard for the function of reason. They wish it understood


that the devotion of naturalists to scientific method does not include any hostility to rational thinking--as was assumed recently by a rather naive supernaturalist who entitled one of his chapters "The Encroachment of Scientific Method on Thought." 178

Professor Magel, in his essay "Logic without Ontology," discusses the "laws of thought" underlying logic and mathematics from the point of view of language as "the instrument for expressing the structures of things and processes." With "empirically minded naturalists," he is "convinced that matters of fact must be supported by sensory observation."179 Krikorian's analysis of mind as organism and

<sup>176.</sup> Dennes, art. (1944).

<sup>177. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. 178. Randall, art.(1944).

<sup>179.</sup> Nagel, art. (1944).



behavior has already been touched upon and will receive further consideration in Chapter IV. 180 Dewey says that the mental functions and moral processes are reducible to "terms and categories of the natural sciences. "181 Regarding reason, he has this to say:

Ancient science accepted the <u>materiel</u> of sense material on its face, and then organized it as it naturally and originally stood, by operations of logical definition, classification into species, and syllogistic subsumption. . . The striking difference in modern science is, of course, the dependence placed upon doing, doing of a physical and overt sort. Ancient science, that is, what passed as science, would have thought it a kind of treason to reason, as the organ of knowing, to subordinate it to bodily activity on material things, helped out with tools which are also material. 182


Reason, generally looked upon as the unique and highest faculty of man, "within the naturalistic framework" becomes subservient to sense experience.

It has been shown that the differences between traditional materialism and recent naturalism are identifiable with the scientists' rejection of the atomic theory and the substitution of the theory of creative evolution. This change in the conception of the ultimate constituents of nature entailed a shift in naturalism from the basic categories of matter, motion, and energy to events, qualities,

<sup>180.</sup> Krikorian, art. (1944).

<sup>181.</sup> Dewey, art. (1940).

<sup>182.</sup> Dewey, QC, 88-89.




and relations. Naturalists believe that their new categories render their method more flexible; hence, they insist that the scientific method be extended without reservation to every known realm, including those—such as mind and value—from which hitherto it had often been regarded as excluded. Every existent is an event within an all-inclusive physical nature. The intellect has been subordinated to sensible experience.

- ii. Points of Identity
- (1) Reliance on Scientific Method. Reliance solely upon the findings of the scientific method is not at all a distinctive mark of recent naturalism. On the contrary, it has been the ruling element of all materialism and naturalism. Sidney Hook puts it thus:

What unites all naturalists . . . from Democritus to Dewey . . . is the wholehearted acceptance of scientific method as the only reliable way of reaching truths about the world of nature, society, and man. 183

The scientific method led Democritus, in the fourth century B.C., to the first systematic exposition of atomistic materialism, which included denial of the soul save as composed

<sup>183.</sup> Hook, art. (1944).



of fine, smooth, fiery atoms. Recent naturalists hold the same essential conclusions, including the denial of the soul or mind save as a manifestation of the biological organism. The scientific method, limited to sensory data, cannot go beyond material objects, and this initial methodological restriction predetermines a materialistic metaphysics.

(2) Primacy of Matter. Matter is that which is opposed to the conscious, the spiritual, and the mental; 183a it is characterized as occupying space. 183b In Runes, the term is defined as "the physical or nonmental," 183c and in Webster, as "that of which any physical object is composed . . . distinguished from incorporeal substance."183d


Recent naturalists, like all materialists, believe that unconscious matter is the basal reality. This is the central idea conveyed by the definitions of naturalism; 183e the new categories refer to sensory objects; 184 Edel, for example. stresses "appreciation of the primacy of matter" as fundamental in naturalistic philosophy. 185 Now, as in the days of Democritus, matter remains matter, whether it be analyzed

<sup>183</sup>a. Supra, 60; also, Brightman, NV, 91.

<sup>183</sup>b. Keeton, art. (1942); Brightman, ITP, 388.

<sup>183</sup>c. Keeton, <u>ibid</u>.
183d. Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "matter."
184. Dennes, art.(1944).


<sup>185.</sup> Ed el, art. (1944).




as composed of atoms, or as an aggregate of centers of energy. Both traditional materialism and recent naturalism believe that all the realities of the universe are but manifestations of matter, and, correlatively, both deny all suprasensible existence. In these essential tenets, the views are identical.

(3) <u>Self-sufficiency of Nature</u>. In previous discussion of the definitions of <u>naturalism</u>, it was pointed out that recent naturalists regard nature as a self-sufficient process, requiring no supernatural or transcendental explanation. Traditional materialists, too, viewed nature as self-sufficient and self-explanatory in terms of the blind motions of atoms in space.

It thus appears that, intrinsically, recent naturalism and traditional materialism are identical. Both accept the scientific method as the sole approach to truth; consequently, both believe that matter and its laws constitute the ultimate reality, and both repudiate the supernatural and supersensible. The differences, however, are important, and mark clearly the significant movement from materialism toward idealism in naturalistic thought. This trend toward idealism is the matter of discussion in the following chapter. Briefly, the idealistic tendencies reside in the departure from the strictly analytic method of materialism;



in the adoption of the idealistic goal of holism, of the idealistic view of being as activity, and in the concept of mind as a unique entity; and in the liberal attitude toward the objectivity of value.



## CHAPTER IV

## NATURALISTIC TREATMENT OF IDEALISTIC VIEWS


- 1. Naturalistic Treatment of the Synoptic Method of Idealism
  - i. Definition of the Synoptic Method

According to Webster, method, derived from two Greek forms meaning "way after," is the pursuit of something; and synoptic, also from two Greeks forms meaning "view together," is defined as "affording a view of the whole." The synoptic method is the method which seeks an understanding of the universe as a whole.

Since Plato taught that true knowledge required that the special sciences no longer remain separate units but that they "be brought together in a synopsis," philosophers down the ages have pursued the ideal of a synoptic comprehension of the universe. The great geniuses have sought the way to a holistic explanation which would satisfy the craving of the human mind for a unitary concept under which to subsume the multiplicity known to experience.

Philosophy is the science of sciences, not in the sense of an aggregate of the sciences, but rather in the sense of the general science which aims at complete truth. Its goal

<sup>1.</sup> Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "method;" "synoptic." 2. Plato, Rep., 537C.



is a comprehensive, integrated explanation of the universal order in its first causes and reasons, by the establishment of the interrelationship of all of experience and of all points of view. For this purpose, the idealistic philosopher believes that the best method thus far devised is the synoptic method of idealism.

The synoptic method is the method appropriate to philosophy, for, as philosophy includes all the sciences, the synoptic method includes all other philosophical methods and surpasses them. It welcomes and respects the achievements of all other methods, but it seeks a deeper and broader meaning than that found in the separate facts of observation, analysis, deduction, and overt verification. The synoptic method utilizes all facts, "views them together," and considers the qualities of the whole, realizing that wholes possess properties often absent in their parts. The synoptic method is the only method which takes into account all available information, and applies the light of reason toward the most coherent explanation of the universe and man. It leads to faith in an Intelligent First Cause.

ii. The Analytic Method of Traditional Materialism A characteristic feature of the scientific method,

<sup>3.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 22-29.

.  which has been the method of all materialism, is the procedure of analysis. Analysis, a term derived from two Greek words meaning "loose up," is defined as the "separation of anything into its constituent parts or elements."4 This definition is also a description of the analytic method which holds that truth is reached through the complete analysis of the objects of perception. The analytic method dissects wholes into parts, observes the parts and their relations, and accumulates facts about them. 5 It classifies rather than advances knowledge. The various sciences, through observation and analysis, accumulate blocks of valuable but isolated data, but their method checks the soaring of the mind to a coherent unified explanation possible of achievement only through synopsis.

The analytic method is an inadequate instrument for the formulation of conclusions about the nature of the universe, because it cannot get beyond observed or observable Hence, it ignores the undeniable experience of the immediate consciousness. Furthermore, it loses sight of the fact that the qualities of wholes are often lost to their parts, and reconstructs the universe from the shreds

<sup>4.</sup> Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "analysis." 5. Brightman, ITP, 22-27; 110-112.

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of analysis: the universe of Democritus was composed of atoms; the universe of the modern naturalists consists in events. The analytic method stops short where the synoptic method begins.

iii. Traces of the Synoptic Method in the Scientific Method of Recent Naturalism

The scientific method of recent naturalism, while essentially analytic, nevertheless bears indications of a trend toward the synoptic method of idealism.

Some of these indications have received attention in connection with other aspects of this discussion. It has been pointed out that these naturalists believe that the new categories implement their method for the adequate investigation of such realms as aesthetic and moral judgments; their method, they feel, is no longer restricted to the analysis of bodies obviously extended in space. Also, the naturalists emphasize their regard for the "laws of thought" and rational thinking in general. This marked recognition of the mental functions, even though these are explained in materialistic terms, seems a definite advance beyond the strictly analytic method of the traditional materialists.

<sup>6.</sup> Hook, art.(1944); Dennes, art.(1944).

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It is particularly in the naturalistic system of Roy Wood Sellars that idealistic tendencies seem most easily discernible. It is not that he is in any sense an idealist, but, while adhering to naturalism, he lays far more stress than do most naturalists upon certain idealistic principles.

Sellars looks upon the analytic method as preeminently the method of philosophy, but he does not identify philosophy and scientific method. He esteems "science and its methods," but science is not the sole arbiter; its function is "doing more of the experimenting and of detailed observation: "8 Science is unable "to explain its own existence and nature;" and some of its basic assumptions, such as the potentiality of the human mind for knowledge, are justifiable only by philosophy. The specialized sciences provide data for philosophy, but "philosophy, itself, is a persistent reflection upon these facts and concepts developed by the sciences; "10 it is not" something superimposed upon science so much as something which science culminates in."11 This statement, albeit marked by extreme caution, barely misses a full expression of the idealistic conception of

<sup>7.</sup> Sellars, art.(1944). 8. Sellars, PPP, 6.

<sup>9.</sup> Sellars, PPR, 45-46.

<sup>10.</sup> Sellars, PPP, 7.

<sup>11.</sup> Sellars, ibid., 179-180.

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of philosophy as the synthesizer of all knowledge.

Sellars is explicit regarding his view of synopsis as a necessary characteristic of the proper method of philosophy. The province of philosophy, he says, is to study the results of all the sciences and to "seek coherence in their synthesis," for the "philosopher is a synthesist by profession."12 "For me," he says, "the task of the philosopher is to analyze concepts and principles and to perform a labor of synthesis."13 A\_ain, in greater detail, he asserts:


In short, the method of philosophy is an analyticsynthetic reflection upon the world as it is spread out before a mind full of the knowledge gained by the sciences. It aims to be a penetrative survey of reality as known. It does not so much have a source of knowledge all its own . . . as a duty to bring human knowledge to its stage of clarification and synoptic synthesis. 14

It would be difficult to find a more accurate expression of the method of idealism than this from the pen of a naturalist. The keynote is reflection; analysis is specified as a prerequisite; the accumulated knowledge of the sciences constitute the data; and the aim is a comprehensive explanation of "reality as known,"

In his esteem for reason, too, Sellars seems to approach

<sup>12.</sup> Sellars, art. (1927).

<sup>13.</sup> Sellars, PPP, 178. 14. <u>Ibid.</u>, 181.




idealism. He describes himself as "a rationalist and skeptical of the self-contradictoriness of reason."15 Yet, in agreement with other recent naturalists, he looks upon mind as a "physical category."16

Among naturalists in general there appear hints of departure from the strictly analytic method of the traditional materialists, and toward the synoptic method of the idealists. The general tendency is apparent in at least two respects. First, the attempted extension of the methods of science into areas unencompassed by the strictly analytic method, indicates a straining toward the flexibility and inclusiveness of the synoptic method. Secondly, recent naturalists admit wide uses of reason.

The method of Sellars is especially colored by tendencies toward the method of idealism. First, Sellars is idealistic in his view of philosophy as the science embracing all other sciences; he does not identify philosophy with the scientific method, as do many naturalists. Secondly, Sellars views synthesis as necessary to an adequate philosophical method. He seems torn between a recognition of the superiority of the synoptic method and an allegiance to the naturalistic method, the balance of power being with

<sup>15.</sup> Sellars, PPR, 341. 16. Sellars, EN, 300.



the latter, for his ultimate conclusions are in terms of "event," an outcome of the analytic method. Finally, Sellars holds reason to be an important factor in philosophical procedure, although <u>reason</u> in his view is but a manifestation of the biological organism.

All in all, the scientific method of recent naturalism is still predominantly analytic. Nevertheless, it is no longer exclusively analytic, and it contains clearly discernible tendencies toward the synoptic method of idealism.

## 2. Naturalistic Treatment of the Holistic Goal of Idealism

i. Idealistic View of the Truth as the Whole

The idealistic system exemplifies, throughout, the philosophical ideal of truth as utterly comprehensive and integrated, at the same time recognizing that, for the finite mind, it is an ideal unattainable but forever beckoning. Holism is the doctrine that the essential nature is located in the whole rather than in its constituent parts; it is based on the fact that a part may not be truly known in isolation, but only as it is completely known in its relations to the whole. Holism has characterized all sound philosophy. The concept is well epitomized in Hegel's

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words: "The truth is the whole."17

The holistic attitude is persistently and unfailingly a ruling principle of idealism. It governs the aim, the data, the method, and the conclusions. The aim is holistic in that it seeks a profound and comprehensive knowledge of all of reality and of its ultimate cause and purpose. The data are holistic, for they comprise all the experiences of men, both mediate and immediate, including a knowledge of all the details discovered by all the sciences, which, in a sense, perform the groundwork of philosophy. The method is holistic in its utilization of every known road to truth. In presupposing all scientific achievements, the method of idealism includes the analytic method and also all the instruments of verification known to the sciences. This is the starting point of synthesis. Then, reason is applied to the consideration of all the facts in all their relationships. Judgments are sifted by the coherence criterion which demands inclusiveness and consistency. The conclusion is necessarily holistic, for nothing known is omitted in the process of forming it. The ultimate explanation is found in the goodness of God, the Intelligent First Cause, who is the Creator of the whole universe.

<sup>17.</sup> Hegel, POM, I, II, 16.

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## ii. Truncated View of Materialism

Materialism evinces the holistic attitude in only one respect, in its aim to explain the whole of reality. There the holistic attitude ends, and the truncated attitude becomes the controlling agent of the data, the method, and the conclusions. At the outset, by identifying philosophy with the natural sciences, materialism nullifies the possibility of a holistic conclusion. Philosophy, the data of which include all the sciences, is identified with a part of its data. Thereby, materialism engages in the objious fallacy of identifying a whole with one of its parts and then explaining the whole in terms of the part.

The major premise of materialism is the belief that all knowledge derives from the scientific method. By this premise, materialism limits its data to the objects of sensory perception, thereby mutilating facts of human experience which are vividly and immediately perceived by the consciousness. The mutilation consists in ignoring, or denying, or arbitrarily explaining in terms of physicalism, such experiences as mind or will immediately recognized as unique. The method is truncated in its limitation to the single procedure of analysis. It disregards synthesis and disparages reason. Validity is found solely in what is

publicly verifiable, and ultimate reality is in the smallest particle found by analysis carried to the uttermost.

Analysis is one part of the synoptic method, the most comprehensive method known. Materialism regards the partial method as more reliable that the holistic method which embraces and surpasses the partial. Materialism, manipulating selected data by means of a partial method, establishes at the outset the conclusion that the ultimate explanation is in the tiniest part that science can find.

iii. Holistic Tendencies in Recent Naturalism

It has been pointed out that recent naturalists have broadened their conception of scientific method beyond the traditional narrow interpretation which regarded it as exclusively analytic. This trend in the direction of a holistic method is accompanied by other holistic tendencies. A holistic conception is suggested in the naturalistic definition of nature as all-inclusive, especially in view of the emphasis upon nature as the whole of reality specifically including man in all his aspects, mental and moral as well as physical, and also in all his activities, not omitting his moral and aesthetic judgments. This concept of man as continuous with all of nature is regarded by naturalists as a notable advance beyond the traditional view,

and toward a unified--or holistic--explanation. In the traditional view,

a purely mechanical system . . . left man--or at least the essential part of his being, his 'mind' . . . in a world stripped of all intelligible structure. Between man, his 'mind' and experience on the one hand, and Nature on the other, there yawned a chasm. . . . Human life and 'mind' grew quite unintelligible in terms of such a mechanistic science. 18

Naturalists consider that the "chasm" has been closed. All things, including man and his mind, are to be interpreted within a "mild mechanism," 19 through the process of creative evolution. At this point in naturalistic thought, there appears an urge toward holism in the attempt at all-inclusiveness, and, in conjunction with it, an outspoken recognition of the qualitative distinction of "mind" expressed in the words, "the essential part of his man's being. The idealistic tendency becomes even more definite in the light of the current scientific and naturalistic conception of matter, as aspect to feceive further attention in the following section.

Inseparably connected with the revised conception of matter is another well-defined trend in recent naturalism

<sup>18.</sup> Randall, art.(1944). 19. Krikorian, art.(1944).

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toward idealistic holism. It stems from the recent shift in naturalism from the traditional categories of matter, motion, and energy to the new basic categories of events, qualities, and relations.


The shift in categories is significant. Naturalists and idealists agree that in the selected categories inhere far-reaching philosophical determinations. It seems undeniable that the basic categories decide the ultimate conclusions, as both Brightman and Dennes assert. Dennes puts it thus:

How, then are philosophical positions (such as those called naturalistic, idealistic, and so forth) distinguished from one another? . . . Many gifted philosophers have lately converged upon one sort of answer to these questions. They have argued that philosophic positions are distinguished essentially by the different basic categories which they employ in interpretation, and by consequent differences in the interpretations which they develop. An examination of the relations that hold between the basic categories employed in explanatory statements and the content of these statements is therefore important for the understanding, not only of naturalistic philosophy, but of any philosophy. 20

Similarly, Brightman says that the nature of any philosophy, whether it be materialistic, agnostic, idealistic, realistic, theistic, or atheistic derives from its doctrine of the categories.<sup>21</sup> The categories themselves, it must be remembered,

<sup>20.</sup> Dennes, art.(1944).

<sup>21.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 96.



are determined by the area and content of experience that the philosopher deems significant.

Recent naturalists are keenly aware of the importance of their shift to the basic category of event. As already noted in Chapter III, they believe that the category of event brings within the scope of a naturalistic explanation unlimited areas, such as mind and value, formerly closed to it; and this "extension" of method tends to holism. Also, holism is manifested in the naturalistic interpretation of events as the ultimate constituents of the whole universe, "of all that exists." The world consists in "events and their qualities and relations;" there exists nothing except "events . . . and further stretches of events. . . . Every range of events is . . . embedded in contexts of such further events;" and an event is "anything which happens."22 A universe consisting of things "which happen" seems closer to the to the idealistic conception of the universe as the expression of God's will, than does a universe explained in terms of rigid atomism and mechanism. 22a

Sellars' system, too, reveals holistic tendencies. Nature, he says, is all-inclusive and "identical with existence

<sup>22.</sup> Dennes, art.(1944).
22a. The naturalist's category of "event" is a manifestation of energy, and the idealist's universe is the energizing of God's will. See infra, 89 and 117.

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and reality," and "man is a part of the fabric of the world."23 Mind is a physical category, and consciousness is "but a feature of a physical event."24

From this discussion, it appears that recent naturalistic thought is characterized by an urge toward a more holistic view than that of traditional materialism. Naturalists are holistic in their attempt to account for the whole universe, inclusive of the whole man with all his experience. The attempted explanation seems less far-fetched when couched in terms of the new category of "event" which has displaced the outmoded theory of discrete atoms. However, the approach to the idealistic view ends in the naturalistic doctrine of the primacy of matter, and the designation of the categories as "sets of occurences" in sensory objects. 25

- 3. Naturalistic Treatment of the Idealistic View of Being as Activity
  - i. Idealistic View of Being as Activity
  - All idealism holds the view that mind is the ultimate

<sup>23.</sup> Sellars, art. (1934).

<sup>24.</sup> Sellars, PPR, 424.

<sup>25.</sup> Dennes, art. (1944).

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reality in the universe. Theistic idealism interprets reality as the functioning of the Divine Will. All physical things exist in the thought and will of God "so that they are nothing apart from Him. . . . Their matter and energy is his conscious purpose concretely expressed." Finite persons are also the expression of the Divine Will, but their being differs from that of physical things in that they are "not identical with his consciousness, as is the being of physical things." For finite persons, God wills an independent existence "genuinely other than Himself; . . . their being is self-conscious and relatively self-determining." Theistic idealism regards the universe as a society of selves all deriving their existence from the activity or functioning of the thought and will of God, in whom resides the ultimate unity. 26

For the theistic idealist, nature has only phenomenal existence, but not in the sense of illusion.

There is universal agreement among both scientists and philosophers that a large part of the sense-world has only phenomenal existence. . . But the phenomenal world remains real in its way. It forms the contents of our objective experience, and is the field in which we all meet in mutual understanding. It expresses, then, a common element to all, and is no

<sup>26.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 245-247.

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private fiction of the individual. Concerning it the proper question is not, Is it real? but rather, What kind of reality does it have? 27

The same author answers the question in the words: "Thought is rapidly reducing the world to phenomenal existence, and making it the manifestation of an energy not its own."28 The world

is not compounded of atoms and their forces, but is rather a product of one infinite, omnipresent, eternal energy by which it is continually supported, and from which it incessantly proceeds.29

The world depends upon God. 30 The first and highest principle of all things is God, the one perfect spiritual Being. Theistic idealism maintains the distinctness of God and the world, yet binds them together in unity, for all existence is the activity, or energizing, of the Divine Mind.

ii. Materialistic View of Being as Mechanistic Atomism Traditional materialism is the view that the ultimate explanation of the universe is found in matter conceived as an aggregate of atoms in motion. The mind is explained as the complex motion of the atoms which form the brain. Atoms, according to earlier science, were minute, indivisible,

<sup>27.</sup> Bowne, MET, 8,9.
28. <u>Ibid</u>., 64.
29. <u>Ibid</u>., 243/
30. <u>Ibid</u>., 119

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discrete, granular particles constantly in motion.


On the basis of the laws of physics, materialism holds that this completely physical universe is self-sufficient and self-explanatory. The progress of the universe, with all its changes, is due to the mechanical relations of atoms in motion. The universe is a mechanism of indestructible tiny particles, and the present is determined and explained as the necessary result of their past relations. The world is "a purely mechanical system of tiny billiard-balls." Materialism offers no explanation rendering comprehensible their claim that hard impersonal atoms, of themselves, move in such a way as to produce the complexity, design, order, and grandeur apparent even to the finite mind.

## iii. Naturalistic View of Being as Activity

Modern science has rendered untenable the traditional materialistic explanation in terms of mechanistic atomism. The atom is now understood, not as a hard indestructible particle, but as organized centers of energy not unlike electricity. The recent naturalist, respecting the conclusions of natural science, is "quite aware that 'matter' has in modern science none of the low, base, inert properties"

<sup>31.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 251, 259. 32. Randall, art.(1944).

<sup>32.</sup> Randall, art.(1944). 33. Brightman, ITP, 108-109.



formerly assigned to it. 34 He has discarded "the earlier Newtonian mechanics which had been unable to handle satisfactorily... the new fields" opened by the "enlarged... concepts of science. "35 He now looks upon the atom as composed of active energy and the universe as a "storehouse of electric energy." 36

In applying to the new basic category the distinctive designation event, the sole specific attribute of which is process, 36a naturalists convey the conception that the ultimately real is activity. Event is derived from the Latin term evenire, meaning to come out, and is defined as "that which comes, arrives, or happens." In etymology and by definition, event involves action. Process is derived from the Latin word procedere, which means to move forward, and id defined as "the act of proceeding . . . a series of actions, motions, or operations . . . continued forward movement." The central meaning of process, like that of event, is action or motion. Naturalists have thus adopted the traditional idealistic view that reality is activity, but they still emphatically repudiate the idealistic

<sup>34.</sup> Dewey, art. (1944).

<sup>35.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>36.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 109.

<sup>36</sup>a. Supra, 89.

<sup>36</sup>b. Neilson (ed.), WNID, s.v. "event."

<sup>36</sup>c. Ibid., s.v. "process."

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hypothesis that Mind is the source and explanation of everything. 36d They have supplanted the theory of mechanistic atomism with the belief that all existence is comprised in a self-explanatory, dynamic physical universe. 36e


Sellars, in relating his philosophical considerations to the electro-magnetic theory of modern science, holds that "it is time that the newer conceptions of matter find their philosophical interpretation, "37 and he calls his system "the new materialism" or "the new naturalism." Atoms exist. he says, as the simplest and the most basic entities conceivable and constitute the floor of the universe. 38 Matter. he asserts, is "active, dynamic, relational and self-organizing,"39 and "at the very least . . . of the stuff of electricity."40 Regarding Sellars' new materialism, Parker comments: "Each step he has taken in the reformation of materialism is a step nearer spiritualism -- one more and he will be there."41

Dewey, too, points the distinction between his own position and nineteenth-century mechanistic materialism. Such materialism, says Dewey, is contrary to fact:

<sup>36</sup>d. <u>Infra</u>, 124.

<sup>36</sup>e. Supra, 116. 37. Sellars, PPR, 232. 38. Sellars, art.(1943).

<sup>39.</sup> Sellars, art.(1944). 40. Sellars, PPR, 321. 41. Parker, art.(1944).



Historically speaking, materialism and mechanistic metaphysics—as distinct from mechanistic science—designate the doctrine that matter is the efficient cause of life and mind, and that 'cause' occupies a position superior in reality to that of 'effect.' Both parts of this statement are contrary to fact.

The Newtonian philosophy of nature, according to which "dead matter moved under impulse of insersate forces," Dewey says, is "now discredited." All Nature is not a mechanism in the older sense of mathematical predetermination, but "something problematic, undecided, still going-on and as yet unfinished and indeterminate."

The wholehearted acceptance by recent naturalists of the theory of evolution represents another advance beyond traditional materialism. Naturalists look upon the publication of the Origin of Species as "the most important si single event in the history of modern naturalism," 45 and so profound is the naturalists' esteem for the theory that the term naturalism has sometimes been identified with evolution. At a Naturalists seem to interpret the theory as an irrefutable apology for their belief that man in all his aspects is within an all-inclusive nature. It is said that

the evolution controversy . . . had the effect of

<sup>42.</sup> Dewey, EAN, 262.

<sup>43.</sup> Dewey, QFC, 110.

<sup>44.</sup> Dewey, EAN, 348.

<sup>45.</sup> Larrabee, art. (1944).

<sup>46.</sup> Ibid.

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
completely demolishing the prestige of idealism, thereby clearing the field for its relatively undamaged opponent. It became evident that man's privileged position in the cosmos and all the defensive idealisms which had sought to bolster it must now be abandoned. Henceforth, all inquiries and debates must be carried on in new terms and in a new setting: as themselves developing activities of growing human organisms mutually adapting and adjusting themselves to their changing and physical and cultural environments.47

As evolutionists, recent naturalists attribute man's estate to activity developed within organisms, of themselves. clue to evolution is self-developed activity, or energy.

The naturalistic stress upon an internal self-development is akin to the dialectical process in the Hegelian system of absolute idealism. Hegel taught that "the truth is the whole, "48 and that reality is "self-becoming, self-development. "49 The self-development consists in a dialectical process in which Spirit, conceived as the higher rational and spiritual principle, is forever seeking fuller realization, and is forever striving toward Freedom, which is the fullest possible realization of man's highest capacities. 50 The Spirit which is the dynamic force of the process, is called the Absolute, the all-inclusive unity,

<sup>47.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>48.</sup> Hegel, POM, I, II, 16. 49. <u>Ibid.</u>, 11, 16. 50. <u>Ibid.</u>, II, II, 34, 35.



embracing not only the causal energy, but also, in a sense, the goal, which is the expression of His inexhaustibly rich potentialities.<sup>51</sup>

The naturalistic conception of the universe suggests the Hegelian conception in several important respects. Both regard reality as an all-inclusive whole; both conceive the universe as a self-developing system; for both, the development derives from activity. The cleavage between the two systems, as between all naturalism and all idealism, is in their respective views regarding the source of the activity; Hegel places the source of all energy in the Absolute Spirit; naturalism places it in matter, albeit matter conceived as singularly endowed with remarkable attributes.

There is another striking advance toward idealism, also inspired in recent naturalism by modern scientific progress. It has been pointed out that the conception of matter as energy brought about the recent naturalistic shift to the category of event, which, while eluding exact definition, nevertheless is taken to mean "anything which happens." Everything, for recent naturalism, consists in events; there is nothing but events, and "further stretches of events:" and

<sup>51.</sup> Hegel, POM, II, II, 101.

categories are referred to as "sets of occurrences." 52 Some remarkably similar statements have been made by a theistic idealist. Bowne asserts:


There is no substantial nature, but only natural events; and a natural event is one which occurs in an order of law, or one which we can connect with other events according to rule. 53

The naturalists and the idealist, Bowne, conceive nature as a process, as a series of events or occurrences. In view of the ultimate metaphysical conclusions inherent in the basic categories selected, <sup>54</sup> the naturalistic category of event suggests the possibility of an unlimited approach to idealism.

The discussion in this section has centered upon the conception of being as activity. Theistic idealism believes that the universe is the creation of the activity of the Mind and Will of God. Traditional materialism views all existence as brought about by the constant motion of an aggregate of tiny, discrete, indestructible, "billiard-ball" atoms, the initial cause of the motion, however, being unexplained and incomprehensible. Recent naturalism, in line with modern science, is at one with idealism in


<sup>52.</sup> Dennes, art.(1944). 53. Bowne, MET, 239.

<sup>53.</sup> Bowne, MET, 239. 54. Brightman, ITP, 96.



regarding being as activity. The naturalistic conception of being as activity is manifest in at least four significant respects: (1) The all-inclusive nature of naturalism consists through and through of atoms composed of centers of active energy, or activity. (2) Naturalists believe, in accordance with the evolution theory which they wholeheartedly accept, that man's status arises from self-developed activities within the organism. (3) The self-developing universe of naturalism bears a resemblance to Hegel's idealistic conception of a "self-becoming, self-developing" Whole. (4) The naturalistic category of event parallels, in a measure, Bowne's view of a nonsubstantial nature composed only of events. Hence, naturalists and idealists agree that being is activity. But there the agreement ends.

The divergence occurs regarding the source of the activity. Naturalists believe the activity to be somehow inherent in matter itself. Idealists believe the initial activity to be in God's Mind. Idealists find this conclusion inescapable because their synoptic method demands consideration of all of experience, and they are therefore bound to take into account the immediately experienced fact that overt action is always preceded by an act of mind. Naturalists, on the other hand, restricted by their method,



are bound, at the risk of self-contradiction, to fashion their explanation of ultimates within the current facts of science.

- 4. Naturalistic Treatment of the Idealistic View of Mind as Basic to Reality
  - i. Reality of Mind in Idealism

A fundamental and characteristic principle of all idealism is the belief that the basic reality is of the nature of mind. Bowne says that mind is the "only ontological reality." He continues:

Intelligence is and acts. This is the deepest fact. It is not subject to any laws beyond itself, nor to any abstract principle within itself. Living, acting intelligence is the source of all truth and reality, and is its own and only standard. 55

God is the sole and independent Cause of the universe. sons, as well as physical things, are the expression of the Mind of the Supreme Person, upon whom alone depends all existence. 56

Physical things, as revealed to the finite mind, suggest

<sup>55.</sup> Bowne, MET, 425. 56. Ibid., 101.

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that they were created by the activity of Mind. "The system of things is active like a mind; changes, like a mind; is coherent and rational, like a mind; and within limits mind can use it."57 Perceived entities seem to be "cast in the molds of thought," for they are continuously more clearly understood by the finite mind. Hence, the idealist finds it more reasonable to believe that they are the energizing of Mind.

Idealism, seeking the most coherent explanation of all experience by means of the synoptic method, is not satisfied with the infinite regress and tautology of mechanism; the more acceptable hypothesis, in this view, is the belief that the only sufficient cause is an Intelligent First Cause, which is the activity of the Mind of God.

## ii. Denial of Mino in Traditional Materialism

Materialism is the view that reality is nonmental, and that the ultimate explanation is to be found in matter and its laws. All materialism, patterned upon Democritean atomism, has modeled its universe upon the physical and has denied to mind any existence apart from matter. Democritus taught that the mind or soul is a complex of fine, smooth,

<sup>57.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 122. 58. Bowne, TTK, 296.

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fiery atoms, penetrating the whole body and imparting life.

Most later materialists have regarded mind as the resultant

of the complex motion of innumerable very fine atoms composing the brain.

Mechanistic atomism offers no intelligible explanation of the immediately experienced facts of consciousness. Volition, thought, hope, choice, or purpose are vividly known to self-experience, but there is nothing analogous to them in matter. <sup>59</sup> The materialistic denial of soul or mind as an incorporeal entity is incoherent when all the facts of experience are taken into consideration.

## iii. View of Mind in Recent Naturalism

The naturalistic concept of mind represents an advance beyond the materialistic view, but it falls far short of the idealistic conclusion that reality is of the nature of mind.

The discussion in Chapter III of this work pointed out that the rejection of mind, in the traditional and idealistic sense, is an integral part of the naturalistic philosophy, and that naturalists are prone to dwell persistently and repeatedly upon their denial of mind.

The view of mind in any philosophical system is vital

<sup>59.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 231-234.

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for the interpretation of mind determines many critical philosophical problems. Dewey puts it thus:

The philosophic implications embedded in the very heart of psychology are not got rid of when they are kept out of sight. Some opinion regarding the nature of mind and its relations to reality will show itself on almost every page, and the fact that this opinion is introduced without conscious intention of the writer may serve to confuse both the author and his reader.60

Dewey denies the traditional "soul" or "mind" which is the mental principle understood as an existence distinct from the body and having personal individuality and identity. Such a "soul" or "mind" he looks upon as merely a "superstitious encumbrance."61 He believes that


Thinking is mental, not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of what physical acts and appliances do: the distinctive purpose for which they are employed. 62

Influenced by Darwinian evolution, Dewey regards both mind and body as organs evolved from lower forms in the struggle for existence. He writes that "the brain is primarily an organ of a certain kind of behavior, not of knowing the world.63 He repudiates all attempts to assign mind and body

<sup>60.</sup> Dewey, <u>Psych</u>., iv. 61. Dewey, <u>EAN</u>, 294.

<sup>62.</sup> Dewey. EEL, 14.

<sup>63.</sup> Dewey, CF, 36.



to different existential realms. 64 He asserts:

A naturalistic metaphysic is bound to consider reflection as a natural event occurring within nature because of the traits of the latter.65

Regarding this salient aspect of Dewey's thought, Max Carl Otto, in Things and Ideals, is particularly articulate:


We are coming to see, thanks especially to John Dewey, that the self is the <u>integration</u>--literally not figuratively -- of organism and environment. As water is the novel result of the combination of two gases, . . . so the self is the active a-malgamation of inborn potentialities and environmental forces, physical and social. . . . We might say that the environment forms habits when it gets organisms to form them with, instead of saying, as we now do, that organisms form habits when they get an environment to form them with.66

This is a pregnant passage. At the outset, Otto places himself unreservedly in accord with Dewey, and he leaves no doubt that he wishes to be understood literally. He affirms Dewey's view of the mind or self as something acquired, something developed by interaction with environment, rejecting what Dewey regards as the basic dualism of all dualisms, namely, that which isolates "mind from activity involving physical conditions, bodily organs, material appliances, and natural objects."67 With Dewey and the

<sup>64.</sup> Dewey, EAN, 284.

<sup>65. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., 68. 66. Otto, TAI,151-152.

<sup>67.</sup> Dewey, DAE, 377.



and the evolutionists and traditional materialists, he holds that the active principle is in the environment.

Krikorian's essay, "A Naturalistic View of Mind," is an apology for and exposition of behaviorism. He takes issue with Professor Hocking's position that "the nature of mind eludes scientific, experimental psychology," and that natural science can deal only with a "Near-mind." Because, for Krikorian, "nature is the whole of reality" and is what "empirical science finds it to be," the "facts of mind" constitute no "cul-de-sac" for naturalism. He writes:

The belief that nature is the whole of reality implies that mind should be examined as a natural phenomenen among other natural phenomena. It has its origin, growth, and decay within the physical, biological and social setting. 68

Krikorian insists that mind is to be investigated through analysis by "objective methods." He asserts that "mind must be analyzed as behavior, since behavior is the only aspect of mind which is open to experimental examination." Mind is "a specific type of behavior" which derives from life, and life depends "on a complex physico-chemical organization" and vanishes "with the disintegration of this." Following a minute analysis of observable behavior,

<sup>68.</sup> Krikorian, art. (1944).

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## Krikorian concludes:

The different dimensions of mind--that is, mind as cognition, as conation, and as consciousness . . . form a unity. And this unity is the whole mind. Yet this unity is not a soul, a psyche, residing in the body. Structurally the unity is the biological organism; behaviorally the unity is the integrated action. 69

This is behaviorism, and, in the light of referral to the "biological organism," it is a denial of consciousness; hence it is metaphysical behaviorism or a "form of materialism." 70

In this connection, it is easily understood that naturalists should hail the publication of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species as "the most important single event in the history of modern naturalism in America,"71 presenting, as it did, a seemingly conclusive exposition of the facts of "man's biological ascent from primordial protoplasm," facts which naturalists "do not presume to question."72 According to Runes, Darwin "served to establish firmly in all scientific minds the fact of evolution."73 It is on this basis that naturalists make statements such as: "The fundamental importance of evolutionary thought" lies primarily


<sup>69.</sup> Krikorian, art. (1944).

<sup>70.</sup> Wood, art. (1945).

<sup>71.</sup> Larrabee, art. (1944).

<sup>72. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>.

<sup>73.</sup> Dennon, art.(1945).



in that man is to be regarded as no different from the "other aspects of the Nature of which he is taken to be a part." 74 Or again:

Scientific workers in the biological field are agreed in accepting some form of genetic development of all species of plants and animals, mankind included. The conclusion puts man definitely and squarely within the natural world. 75

In adopting the evolutionary point of view, naturalists look upon mind and mental functions, like the physical organs, as the outcome of favorable variations through natural selection.

Nevertheless, despite all this, there is in recent naturalism a marked departure from the rigidity of the traditional materialistic denial of mind as a unique being. Krikorian's "integrated action," even though assigned to the "biological organism," is progress when compared with the random clash of atoms. Also, among recent naturalists, there is recognition, to a degree, of the distinctiveness of mind, intelligence, consciousness, conation, and of rational, logical, and moral processes, together with an earnest attempt to explain them, albeit always "within the

<sup>74.</sup> Randall, art. (1944).

<sup>75.</sup> Dewey, art. (1944).

framework of naturalism." However, recognition is far removed from denial, and at least suggests the possibility of further progress in the same direction.

It is in Sellars' system that the changing naturalistic concept of mind is most clearly defined. Some of Sellars' assertions regarding mind are idealistic to a startling degree, even though he denies the ontological reality of mind in statements such as: "The physical is but another term for being." That which is physical is real, and that which is real is physical." The mind as a continuant is the brain and the brain is in spatial relations with other physical systems."

Yet he rejects behaviorism, denies epiphenomenalism, and asserts the uniqueness and creativity of mind. Regarding behaviorism, he says:


If . . . any psychologist comes to me and says that there is no such thing as consciousness, I simply reply that he does not know what he is saying. He may be a very good student of animal behavior. But behavior is not a premise from which the denial of consciousness can be deduced. 79

With reference to epiphenomenalism, he writes: "The old, deductive mechanical necessitarianism which thought of man

<sup>76.</sup> Sellars, PPR, 6.

<sup>77. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., 13. 78. <u>Ibid</u>., 434.

<sup>79.</sup> Sellars, EN, 18.



as a machine and consciousness as a mere psychic illumination has received a shrewd blow."80

Seemingly approaching the idealistic concept of mind, Sellars says: "Intelligent integrations of the brain need consciousness to guide them."81 He affirms the "creative power of intelligence, "82 and the unique status of mind: "The situation is unique. Only in consciousness does nature know itself."83 "Literally it | consciousness | assists the brain to solve problems."84 "The conscious self sits in the watch-tower of the brain to guide the organism's behavior."85 In emphasizing the uniqueness, the effective energy, and the creativity of mind, Sellars is in harmony with idealism.

But Sellars' writings abound in counter-statements which utterly dispel the impression of idealism. He says, for example, "Man is no more real than a dog; he is simply different and able to do things that a dog cannot do."86 "Stars, plants, ants, and human beings are equally real. So far as existence is concerned, it is meaningless to speak of higher and lower. "87 And the following seems to be a flat denial of mind in the incorporeal sense of the

<sup>80.</sup> Sellars, EN, 276.

<sup>81.</sup> Sellars, <u>ibid.</u>, 313.

<sup>82.</sup> Ibid., 314.

<sup>83.</sup> Ibid., 310.

<sup>84.</sup> Sellars, art.(1918). 85. Sellars, EN, 317: 86. Sellars, RCA, 13/ 87. Sellars, PPR, 6.

idealistic view:

Even the psychologist has become skeptical of spirits and souls as agents. They seem to him round squares, wholes without parts, creative energies which need no fuel. Animism . . . has been giving way to a naturalistic interpretation of mind which cuts loose from the ghost-soul. 88

Sellars defines consciousness as "an event" resting upon "mind-brain" activity.89 it "is not an independent event but a feature of a physical event."90 "It is obvious that we cannot assign efficacy to consciousness by itself, since it is merely a feature of the cortical event."91 "In short, make consciousness intrinsic to the brain event, and its efficacy cannot conflict with the facts of physiology and behaviorism. "92 "Mind," he asserts, "has become attached to the organism, absorbed by it, in some sense spatial, "93 and "a character of the neural system in action."94 "The emergent evolutionist, with his belief in the significance of organization, regards thinking as a nervous operation."95 Sellars' conception of mind is well summarized in this passage:


The 'under-the-hat' theory of mind, as it is deri sively called by both idealists and Cartesian

<sup>88.</sup> Sellars, EN, 323. 92. Sellars, PPP, 382. 89. Sellars, PPR, 408, 422. 93. Sellars, PPR, 411. 88. Sellars, EN, 323.

<sup>90.</sup> Ibid., 424.

<sup>91.</sup> Sellars, art. (1936).

<sup>94.</sup> Sellars, EN, 311. 95. Sellars, PPR, 429.



dualists, makes mind local, emergent, physical, and conscious. 96

It thus appears that, on the one hand, Sellars often seems on the threshold of idealism. He himself says, "I would not be understood as refusing to recognize the truth of much of that for which idealism stood in opposition to the older naturalism."97 So marked is Sellars' stress upon the creativity and effective energy of mind, that Pratt comments that he, Sellars, seems to have overthrown his own naturalism.98 On the other hand, Sellars nullifies the idealism in his thought, for all interpretations are "within the framework of naturalism:" consciousness is an "event" in the physical system; mind is "a character of the neural system" and "a physical category;" and thinking is a "nervous operation."

All in all, these recent naturalists have made a signal departure from the atomistic view of mind held by the traditional materialists. In the works of modern naturalists, there is rather generally a recognition of mind as an entity stubbornly distinct from body in the obvious sense—so persistently distinctive in its manifestations that naturalists are constrained to devote considerable

<sup>96.</sup> Sellars, EN, 316.

<sup>98.</sup> Pratt, art.(1936).

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attention to an attempted explanation within the restrictions of the scientific method. There is discussion of reason, consciousness, conation, and rational and moral judgments. Sellars, particularly, seems to advance beyond the older materialism in his affirmation of the uniqueness, creative activity, and efficacy of mind. In this conception, Sellars is at one with the idealists; and all naturalists, in harmony with the idealists, explain mind as activity. But at this point the systems diverge. Idealism believes that the activity originates in the Mind of God. Naturalism believes that the activity is inherent in a self-sufficient matter, the key to their view being the evolution theory. Evolution is the catalyst which dissolves for them the most stubborn stumbling-block of all materialism: the immediately experienced and incomparably unique character of thought and will. And so, after a detour in the direction of idealism, these naturalists return to an essentially physical explanation: "mind or purposiveness or any other event or quality are explained in the same way . . . as cyclones or northern lights."99 Pratt's comment anent Sellars discussions seems pertinent to the naturalistic view

<sup>99.</sup> Lamprecht, art. (1944)

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as a whole. He says that Sellars has done nothing

to help Materialism out of its old dilemma of being forced either to identify consciousness with the brain or to deny its efficacy. . . . Professor Sellars is unwilling to commit himself to either of these difficulties, and ends by falling a victim to both. 100

Yet, all this being so, there is, in recent naturalistic thought, an unmistakable departure from the older materialism and a suggestion of idealism. Mind is no longer denied save as the motion of discrete atoms. Naturalists recognize mind, and they recognize it as activity.

- 5. Naturalistic Treatment of the Idealistic View of Value
  - i. Idealistic View of Value

Value, the good, is what is regarded as desirable. "By a value (or worth, or good) is meant whatever is desired, or enjoyed, or prized, or approved, or preferred." Mackenzie's definition runs similarly: "When we value anything, we generally like it; we are pleased by its presence and more or less pained by its absence." Hocking says that "Our actions drive incessantly to their ends, and these

<sup>101.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 126. 102. Mackenzie, UV, 126.

ends we call values."103 Value is what is sought because it is deemed good, and is thus the mainspring of man's activities. As the focal drive of man's life, it has necessarily occupied an important place in man's thoughts since the dawn of philosophy: "Ever since man began to think he has been concerned about the question, What is truly good or valuable?"104

The question of the origin of value has been a perennial subject of philosophic discussion. Brightman says:

Thinkers who agree on many points, disagree about this fundamental question. Are values simply and solely relative to human desires and pleasures, customs and institutions; or are they in some way permanent, objective aspects of the universe?

The latter hypothesis has been the idealistic view ever since Plato phrased his concept of the Good. Plato taught that human values are reflections of an ideal order of perfect forms or patterns which exist in heaven, the Supreme Idea being the Idea of the Good:

You will agree that the Sun not only makes the things we see visible, but also brings them into existence and gives them growth and nourishment; yet he is not the same thing as existence. And so with the objects of knowledge; these derive from the Good not only their power of being

<sup>103.</sup> Hocking, MGHE, 125.

<sup>104.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 139.

<sup>105.</sup> Ibid., 149.

known but their very being and reality; and Goodness is not the same thing as being but even beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power. 106

In the Laws, Plato says: "It is God who is, for you and me, of a truth the 'measure of all things,' much more truly than, as they say, 'man,'"107 goodness and all things owe their existence to God. 108

All idealism places the rootage of value above and beyond the realm of man. Parker puts it thus:

According to the Platonic-Christian tradition, which constitutes the intellectual framework of our civilization, the authority of the ethical rests on a basis, if not supernatural, at least transcendent. 109

Brightman says: "Only for persons can ideals, obligations, values, be real;"110 and "the objectivity of values would then mean their existence as purposes of the Divine Mind."111 Bertocci upholds the theory that


What is called purposeless harmony in the world is of such a nature that it is most adequately interpreted as the display of a Mind capable of grander rational themes and moral-aesthetic aims than is the finite fighter for ends. 112

<sup>106.</sup> Plato, Rep., VI, 509B. 107. Plato, Laws, IV, 716C. 108. Ibid., IV, 597B.

<sup>109.</sup> Parker, HU, 3. 110. Brightman, ITP, 125.

<sup>111.</sup> Ibid., 169.

<sup>112.</sup> Bertocci, art. (1947).



Sorley regards the moral order "as the order of a Supreme Mind and the ideal of goodness as belonging to this Mind." 113 He says:

Wherever there is intrinsic worth in the world, there also, as well as in moral goodness, we see a manifestation of the Divine. God must therefore be conceived as the final home of values, the Supreme Worth--as possessing the fulness of knowledge and beauty and goodness and whatever else is of value for its own sake. 114

The idealistic view of value as originating in the Mind of God implies several specific aspects of value. For the idealist, values are absolute, permanent, and eternal, and their objectivity resides not only in their origin but also in their validity:


That an objective value is one that all minds that think reasonably ought to acknowledge (logical objectivity); and that it is valid not only for human individuals and groups, but for the universe, the reality on which man depends and in harmony with which he lives (metaphysical objectivity). 115

Also, in idealism, values form a system which comprises all values, and is itself the supreme value. ley asserts, "If we are to compare values at all, we must give up the idea of a scale for that of a system,"116 and.

<sup>113.</sup> Sorley, MVIG, 353.

<sup>114. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, 51. 115. Brightman, ITP, 150.

<sup>116.</sup> Sorley, ibid., 53.




similarly, Brightman states, "No value has sovereignty in its rational territory; only the league of values is sovereign." eign." 117

The idealist believes that the innumerable evidences of value point to an intelligent arrangement involving purpose and plan of which only Mind is capable. He holds that values such as duty, beauty, and love constitute powerful inspirations which could stem only from an infinite Source which bestows them, in feebler degrees, upon the finite mind. Hence, the idealist concludes that values are the purposes of the Supreme Mind, that these Divine purposes can never be completely comprehended by man, but that man is able to discover them progressively and to establish them as norms of his actions.

Windelband sets forth the idealistic point of view admirably:

Ethical and aesthetic judgments display, in the mind of an unprejudiced observer, an extremely great diversity when one surveys the various peoples of the earth in succession. Here again, however, we try to set up a final standard of values; we speak of higher and lower standards of morality or of taste in different peoples and different ages. Where do we get the standard for this judgment? And where is the mind for which these ultimate criteria are the values? If it is quite inevitable to rise above relativity in individual

<sup>117.</sup> Brightman, POR, 101.



appreciations and the morals of various peoples to some standard of absolute values, it seems necessary to pass beyond the historical manifestations of the entire human mind to some normal consciousness for which these absolute values are values, 118

## ii. Value in Traditional Materialism


Traditional materialism, regarding mind as a temporary grouping of atoms in motion, looks upon value as a temporary, humanly devised concept. Inasmuch as the analytic method reduces human experience to an aggregate of extended discrete particles, value is interpreted as the "special movements of the particles or internal movements:"119 it is a material entity. 120

Beginning with Democritus, who taught that the highest good is a perpetually joyous disposition, the attainment of which demands wise discrimination among pleasures, all materialists have held that value is subjective. In this view, value is strictly relative to the human situation; it exists only as man can find or make it. 121 The mechanistic material universe has come about through the blind motion of matter, and, having no Personal Cause, it is not capable of realizing ends or purposes or values. It is a "vain dream"

<sup>118.</sup> Windelband, ITP, 215. 119. Edel, art.(1944).

<sup>120.</sup> Brightman, ITP, 205-206.

<sup>121. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, 207.



to imagine that values are objective, absolute, eternal, or universal.

iii. Value in Recent Naturalism

Recent naturalism frankly traces its theory of value to "the history of materialism from Democritus through Hobbes and the French materialists to the Marxian school." To this background have been added "the evolutionary ethical theory" and the "stubborn empiricism of much of the Utilitarian structure," culminating to a large degree in the ethical theory of John Dewey. 122

In the naturalistic investigation of value, the emphasis is upon the extension of the empirical or scientific method. The approach of naturalism involves

designation of the empirical material with which ethics is concerned, and continual testing of the utility of ethical formulations in terms of this material. Insistence on such testing is part of the naturalistic stress on the primacy of matter; recognition that ethical formulations may require alteration is a consequence of noting the pervasiveness of change. Reliance upon scientific method, together with an appreciation of the primacy of matter, I take to be the central points of naturalism as a philosophic outlook. 123

<sup>122.</sup> Edel, art. (1944).

<sup>123.</sup> Ibid.



In this passage, Edel emphasizes "utility in terms of empirical material" and lack of permancy of "ethical formulations."

Maturalists believe that the ambiguity in ethical terms may be abrogated by the unlimited application of their method. "Feeling is declared to be a kind of interior movement," and a "desire . . . is translated into the language of physics," leading to the deduction of "the generalizations of ethics . . . from physical laws." Choice is an "event in nature, complex indeed," but grounded in the environment. Value finds it source "somewhere in the domain of human activity."


Maturalists recognize no ultimate values in the idealistic interpretation. For naturalism, ultimate values

are simply intense or pervasive attitudes of men in a natural or social world functioning in a special way with relation to other values. . . . In the light of varying values—arising out of individual and social change—they may be accepted or rejected. . . . In recognizing that they function as ultimate in the lives of specific individuals or groups, naturalistic ethics does not give them an intuitive or transcendental status.

<sup>124.</sup> Edel, art.(1944).

<sup>125.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. 127. <u>Ibid</u>.



In this view, a value is ultimate only in the sense that it seems the most desirable object for "specific individuals or groups" in a specific situation; hence, the <u>ultimate</u> value may change momentarily. These naturalists insist that "there is no absolute terminal value; . . . terminal values are always related to specific contexts." 128

For the modern naturalist there are no distinctively ethical statements. 129 Values and disvalues are defined

as the objects of love and hate. . . . No object could be intrinsically valuable, since any object can be either loved or hated, or neither loved nor hated. 130

According to this writer, the so-called "validity" of value revealed upon analysis to be nothing more than a matter of relationships "to other stretches of existence, including various human actions," which, in themselves, are neutral so far as value is concerned. 131


Edman expresses a similar view. Value, he says, consists in "the fulfillment of desires and capacities: realization," and the <u>summum bonum</u>

generally turns out to be simply the current

<sup>128.</sup> Hook, art. (1944).

<sup>129.</sup> Edel, art.(1944). 130. Dennes, art.(1944).

<sup>131.</sup> Ibid.



social and economic prepossessions of an influential class, local cliches, written, as it were, across the sky. The highest good has a strange way of changing from generation to generation. 132

John Dewey, in <u>Theory and Valuation</u>, analyzes value as strictly utilitarian. He asserts that "Value-propositions of the distinctive sort arise whenever things are appraised as to their suitability and serviceability.." He says that valuations "are constant phenomena of human behavior" and are to be investigated in the light of "physical relations." His conclusion is that valuation consists in the coordination of two sources of energy: the energy of the environment and the energy of the organism, "the two kinds of energy being theoretically (if not as yet completely so in practice) capable of statement in terms of physical units." 135


In the Krikorian volume, Dewey affirms a naturalistic code of morals and calls idealists to account for what he styles a misinterpretation of his view. Then he goes on to state:

The idea that unless standards and rules are absolute, and hence eternal and immutable, they are not rules and criteria at all is childish. If

<sup>132.</sup> Edman, FWP, 290-291.

<sup>133.</sup> Dewey, TV, 51.

<sup>134. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, 57. 135. <u>Ibid.</u>, 53.




there is anything confirmed by observation it is that human beings . . . naturally institute values. Having desires and having to guide their conduct by aims and purposes, nothing else is possible. But it is likewise an abundantly confirmed fact that standards and ends which are now influential grew up and obtained their effectiveness over human behavior in all sorts of relatively accidental ways particularly under conditions of geographical isolation, social segregation, and absence of scientific method. It requires a good deal of pessimism to assume that vastly improved knowledge of nature, human nature included, . . . will not be employed to render human relationships more humane, just, and liberal. 136

This statement epitomizes the recent naturalists' theory of value: value is not absolute nor eternal nor permanent; it is instituted by human beings under the influence of environment; it will probably change for the better through increasing application of the scientific method to the study of nature, and the improved character of value will probably manifest itself in better human relationships.

Naturalistic ethical theory has developed concomitantly with the sciences. Formerly, value was interpreted "on a physical analogy as special movements of the particles or internal movements." With the development of the Darwinian evolution theory, value came to be explained largely in terms of biology. Later, the recognition of "the causal

<sup>136.</sup> Dewey, art. (1944).




role of social factors" opened a wider vista, and naturalists tend now to emphasize the social locale of value. Naturalistic ethics "insists upon a continuous testing of goals in the light of their social functioning," on the view of value as rooted in "the practices and institutions of a society" which is constantly changing; and it seeks to fashion "a whole conception of good men functioning in a good society." 137

Recent naturalism and traditional materialism both hold a view of value fundamentally at variance with the idealistic concept. Both regard value as relative, temporary, and of human origin. Yet the two views are not identical. Modern naturalism is an advance toward idealism in ascribing the source of value to activity instead of to solid particles, and also in the recognition of such ideals as social justice and humanity.

In Sellars' system, particularly, an idealistic tenor is discernible. Sellars defines value as "anything which we desire, need, want, enjoy either for its own sake or as a means." He sees value as a pivotal force in the life of man: "That value is central to human living, we soon

<sup>137.</sup> Edel, art.(1944). 138. Sellars, PPP, 434.



realize when we grasp the fact that values are objects valued."139 He considers that values form a hierarchy, the bodily values as the lowest, and the religious, moral, and intellectual values as the highest. 140 Thus far -- with the single exception that in idealism religion is accorded the highest place--Sellars' view is idealistic.


Also, he seems at times to regard value as objective. He says, "I shall myself take as objective a view of value as possible." 141 Foreover, he suggests that value is of cosmic rootage and not merely relative to the human situation: "It is obvious," he says, "that I hold that value judgments do and must fit into the cosmos. "142 He denies relativism and subjectivism:

I am going to stress the question of factualism in the theory of value because it seems to me basic. Its implications are expressed in the old tag that there is no disputing about tastes. Tastes are ultimate facts to be recognized as such. . . . The inadequacy of ethical and aesthetic relativism, or subjectivism, has been that it has left us with brute facts without possibility of revision through discussion and investigation. . . . It presupposes a dogmatic attitude of finality. . . . The factualist is a dogmatist. . . . The real difference between him and the authoritarian is that the latter is in power. In neither is there the willingness to appeal to reason and experience and open up questions for more developed response. 143

<sup>139.</sup> Sellars, PPP, 435.

<sup>140. &</sup>lt;u>Ibic.</u>, 457. 141. Sellars, PPR, 445.

<sup>142.</sup> Sellars, EN, 342. 143. Sellars, PPR, 451.



In several respects, then, Sellars suggests a rejection of the naturalistic conception of value and an affirmation of the idealistic view. This tendency appears in the importance he accords to value in human living, in his formulation of a hierarchy of values, in his explicit reference to the objectivity of value, in his denial of relativism and subjectivism, and in his assertion that value is organic to the cosmos.


However, Sellars' works afford passages which serve to counteract completely this impression of an idealistic conclusion. There are passages, such as the following, in which he locates value within the limitations of the human realm, making it subjective and relative. He says:

The ultimate rational sanction of morality is the fact that it is grounded in the nature of man. He who is social and selective in his valuations is by that very fact a moral agent. It springs out of and cannot be removed from, intelligent human living.

. . The gist of our conclusion, then, is that morality and its categories are intrinsic to that level of nature which we call human living.

He asserts that "there is no one universal <u>summum bonum</u>." On the contrary, the best and most satisfying glimpkes of life are found in the "sympathetic delineations of human living"

<sup>144.</sup> Sellars, PPP, 426.




by the best authors. 145 However, Sellars does not inquire regarding the fountain-head of the authors' inspiration. Fe sees "no reason to assume transcendent absolute values," for a "more adequate basis" is to be found "in the emergence of well-informed and sensitive persons."146 As previously mentioned, Sellars regards man as a part "of the fabric" of an all-inclusive physical nature, which he holds to be utterly self-sufficient:

Let me frankly say that I cannot -- with the best desire in the world--see adequate grounds for the assumption that physical systems are not self-suf-fficient. 147

In his final conclusions, therefore, Sellars agrees with naturalists in general and with the traditional materialists in rejecting the essential features of the idealistic view of value. Value is not objective, nor absolute, nor eternal, nor universal, nor in any sense transcendent nor supernatural. However, in recent naturalism and particularly in Sellars' thought, there are certain tendencies toward the idealistic conception. This trend is marked by the naturalistic belief in activity as basic, and also in stress upon social justice. In Sellars' view, there is a

<sup>145.</sup> Sellars, PPP, 408.

<sup>146. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, 457-458. 147. <u>Ibid.</u>, 446.



further liberality apparent in his discussion of the objectivity of value, and in his intimations that value is of cosmic significance.

Nevertheless, modern naturalists are still closely allied to the materialistic position, and they cannot but remain so while they adhere to their basic tenet regarding method. As long as they bind themselves by the restrictions of the scientific method, they will be limited to a materialistic explanation, barring themselves from the more coherent idealistic hypothesis that all being has its source in the energizing of the Divine Mind of God.




SUMMARY



The introductory chapter of this dissertation was devoted to a consideration of preliminary matters. The chapter opened with a quotation from G. K. Chesterton indicating the practical importance in everyday living of the philosophical view-point maintained. It was pointed out that the present tragic world situation is the result of the conflict between idealistic and materialistic ideologies. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the rift between the two systems was crystal clear: materialism was the denial of idealism. Modern science, however, has given rise to certain idealistic tendencies in recent naturalism. An investigation of these tendencies is the purpose of this study.

There followed, in Chapter I, a survey of the literature used as source material. This included naturalistic and idealistic authors. John Dewey, as the central figure in modern naturalism, received particular comment. His world-wide influence was touched upon, and some opinions regarding his thought were presented.


In Chapter II, the main traits of traditional materialism and of traditional idealism were set forth. The discussion included a brief account of the history of each system, the definition of each, and a statement of the main
traits of each. <u>Idealism</u> was defined as the theory that



ultimate reality is of the nature of mind or consciousness, and that values are objective; and the main traits
of idealism were listed as: (1) the synoptic method; (2)
the holistic goal of a coherent interpretation of all of
experience; (3) the belief that being is activity; (4) the
belief that mind is the ultimate explanation of the universe; (5) the belief in cosmic purpose: (6) the objectivity of value.


Materialism was defined as the theory that the ultimate explanation is to be found in matter and its laws; and the main traits of materialism were given as: (1) the analytic method; (2) restriction to sensible data; (3) atomism; (4) the ultimate reality is matter; (5) mechanism and the rejection of the supernatural; (6) subjectivity of value.

In Chapter III, the main traits of recent naturalism were reviewed. Consideration was first centered upon the definition of the terms <u>nature</u>, <u>naturalism</u>, and <u>supernaturalism</u>. It was shown that, despite vagueness and ambiguity surrounding these words, nevertheless both historical and general usage sustain clear precise meanings for them. In recognized usage, it appeared that <u>nature</u> designates a <u>part</u> of reality, the world of sense objects in space and




world, including man, to a being whose nature and power transcend tha natural world; and that <u>naturalism</u> is the doctrine which expands the conceptions of the natural sciences into a world-view, denying the reality of the supernatural, spiritual, and transcendental. The naturalists agree to the generally accepted definition of <u>naturalism</u>, but they define <u>nature</u> as all of reality, homogeneous throughout and amenable in all its parts, including man, to the methods of the natural sciences; it follows that they deny the existence of anything beyond sensory nature: there is no supernatural.

The chapter continued with an investigation of the characteristic features of recent naturalism, and a comparison of recent naturalism with traditional materialism. The characteristic features were found to be threefold: (1) the crux of naturalism is the fundamental dogma of the sole and exclusive validity of the scientific method, which is restricted to sensory objects; (2) the doctrine of rejection, which is the denial of all supersensible existence: (3) a certain stress among naturalists upon the agreements and divisions in their thought: the agreements were shown to be fundamental and determinative, as the faith in the scientific method as the only clue to reality and the correlative rejection of all



supersensory reality; the divisions emerged as relatively superficial and "within the framework of naturalism," for example, the two different approaches to scientific knowledge employed, respectively, by the structuralists and the functionalists.


The comparison of naturalism with the older materialism brought to light two main points of departure and three salient points of identity. The points of departure, based upon current scientific conceptions, were noted as: (1) Matter is now conceived as ultimately composed of centers of active energy and not as hard, indestructible, discrete atoms; on this basis, the new basic categories of events, qualities, and relations have replaced the outmoded categories of extended atoms, energy, and motion. An event is "anything which happens," and designates a set "of occurrences which are visible or audible or otherwise sensible." (2) Recent naturalism is marked by a changed concept of the scientific method. Naturalists now insist upon the extension of their method, without reservation, to every area, including such realms as mind and value formerly closed to scientific investigation, because they they believe that the new categories permit an adequate analysis of "any qualities experienced or imaginable." Also, modern naturalists stress the function of reason in their method.



Naturalism and traditional materialism were revealed as identical in their fundamental tenets: (1) Both whole-heartedly indorse the scientific method as the only reliable way of reaching truth, and both understand the scientific method as restricted to sensory data. (2) Both believe in the primacy of matter. (3) Both regard nature as a self-sufficient process, requiring no supernatural explanation.


Chapter IV is focused upon the naturalistic treatment of idealistic views. (1) There are in recent naturalism discernible tendencies toward the synoptic method of idealism. These tendencies appear in the urge toward inclusiveness in the naturalistic attempt at the undimited extension of their method, and in the admission of the wide uses of reason. However, the method of naturalism remains predominantly analytic, although not exclusively so.

- (2) The holistic goal of idealism seems also to be the goal of naturalism. The naturalistic aim is the explanation of the whole universe, inclusive of man in all his aspects, mental, moral, and physical, and the category of event, as "anything which happens," seems to lend itself to this end.
- (3) The idealistic conception of being as activity is also a belief of recent naturalism. However, idealists regard the ultimate reality as mental activity, while



naturalists believe that it is somehow inherent in matter with no transcendental cause.

- (4) The idealistic concept of mind as basic to reality is not accepted in naturalistic thought. Nevertheless, recent naturalism marks a signal advance over the traditional materialistic view. Mind is no longer denied except as a complex of atoms in motion. Naturalists recognize mind and they recognize it as activity.
- (5) The idealistic belief that value is an eternal objective aspect of the universe is essentially at variance with the naturalistic view that value is relative to the human situation. Yet, in naturalistic discussion, there appear hints of an idealistic trend in a liberal attitude toward the objectivity of value, and in stress upon social justice.



CONCLUCIONS




- 1. Until the twentieth century, idealism and materialism, for the most part, maintained antipodal positions on all important philosophical issues. Recent naturalism, influenced by current scientific developments, manifests some tendencies toward idealistic views.
- 2. Specifically, the traditional conflict between the two systems centered upon the following features: the synoptic method of idealism was opposed by the analytic method of materialism; holism was contrasted with atomism; being as the activity of mind stood in contradistinction to being as the motion of atoms; mind as the ultimate reality was in opposition to matter as the ultimate reality; and the objectifity of value conflicted with the subjectivity of value.
- 3. Ambiguity and obscurity surround the meaning of the term <u>nature</u>. In defining <u>nature</u> as all that there is, naturalists contribute nothing toward resolving the confusion.

  Recognized authorities and general usage construe <u>nature</u> as denoting physical reality; it seems wiser to retain this clear and specific meaning which has been preserved, rather than to make <u>nature</u> a synonym for all.
- 4. In the naturalistic view, <u>nature</u> is the totality of reality inclusive of man in all his aspects, mental, moral, and physical; it is a self-sufficient, self-developing

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
system with no supernatural nor transcendental sanctions; it is homogeneous throughout its structure, and in all its parts it is amenable to investigation by the physical or natural sciences.

- 5. The crux of recent naturalistic philosophy is the belief in the sole and exclusive validity of the scientific method which is restricted to sensory data. Consequently, naturalists deny all supersensible existence; they reject everything known as supernatural, spiritual, and transcendental; and they disavow the existence of God, the doctrine of immortality, and the reality of soul or mind save as a physical category.
- 6. In numerous points, recent naturalism and traditional materialism are identical: both indorse the exclusive validity of the scientific method; both affirm the primacy of matter; and both assert the self-sufficiency of nature. Recent naturalistic thought, in recognition of the current scientific conception of matter as ultimately consisting of fields of force not unlike electficity, departs significantly from traditional materialism: The recent shift from the former categories of extended atoms, energy, and motion to the new basic categories of events, qualities, and relations marks an important advance. An event is "anything which happens" and designates a set "of occurrences




which are visible or audible or otherwise sensible." Naturalists believe that the new categories permit the unlimited extension of their method, which, they hold, provides an adequate analysis of "any qualities experienced or imaginable."

- 7. Recent naturalistic thought is characterized by tendencies toward the views of traditional idealism, in several essential aspects. The current scientific method, in its departure from the limitations of strict analysis and in its emphasis upon reason and reflection, tends toward the synoptic method of idealism.
- 8. Secondly, idealistic holism has become the goal of recent naturalists in their attempt to explain the whole universe, specifically inclusive of the mental and moral aspects of man, which were unintelligible in the mechanistic theory.
- 9. In the third place, the most significant and fundamental advance toward idealism consists in the concurrence of recent naturalists in the traditional idealistic view that being is activity.
- 10. A fourth indication of the idealistic trend in naturalistic philosophy is the recognition, among naturalists in general, of the unique qualities of mind, and their earnest attempts at explanation; and, in Sellars in



particular, the assertion of the creative activity and efficacy of mind.

11. Finally, in naturalistic discussion of value there is a trend toward idealism in the emphasis upon social justice, and in a liberal attitude toward the idealistic belief in the objectivity of value.



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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## IDEALISTIC TENDENCIES IN SOME RECENT NATURALISM

Abstract of a Dissertation

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

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Until the twentieth century, idealism and materialism stood in full opposition on all important philosophical issues. Recent naturalism, influenced by current scientific developments, manifests some tendencies toward idealistic views. The problem of this dissertation is the investigation of these tendencies.

The main traits of traditional idealism constitute a point-by-point antithesis to those of traditional materialism. The synoptic method of idealism was in contrast to the analytic method of materialism. Holism opposed atomism. Being as the activity of mind stood counterpoised to being as the motion of discrete atoms. Mind as the ultimate reality was in conflict with matter as the ultimate reality. Value as objective and eternal ran counter to value as subjective and relative. The two systems were in stark contradiction, the one an unqualified denial of the other. The rigidity of the older materialistic position seems less inflexible at certain points in modern naturalistic thought.

The crux of recent naturalistic philosophy is the fundamental dogma of the sole and exclusive validity of the scientific method as the avenue to truth and knowledge; there is no reality except that revealed by the methods of the physical or natural sciences. This initial restriction

 to sensory data is "the framework of naturalism." It is the nuclear cell from which derive all naturalistic tenets. It determines the belief that all reality consists of sensible objects, and hence, the view of nature as the totality of reality, homogeneous in character and identical in structure and operation in all its parts. Herein resides the necessity for the naturalistic doctrines of rejection, regarded by Dennes as the mark of "distinction from other philosophical positions;" naturalists deny all supersensible existence; they repugiate everything known as supernatural, spiritual, or transcendental; they disavow the existence of God, the reality of soul or mind save as a physical category, and the doctrine of immortality. In the basic and determinative belief in the sole reliability of the scientific method, as well as in the correlative views of the primacy of the material and the rejection of the supernatural, modern naturalism is at one with traditional materialism.

Recent naturalism, however, seeks to transcend materialism. The distinction parallels the advance of science from an outmoded nineteenth-century physics. In current scientific theory, matter is not composed of indestructible particles; it is mow believed to consist of fields of force, centers of active energy, not unlike electricity. The

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changed scientific concept of matter has entailed a revision of some aspects of naturalistic philosophy.

In conformity with the changed concept of matter, naturalism has made a "striking shift" from the former categories of extended matter, energy, and motion, to the new basic categories of events, qualities, and relations. These categories are the ultimate constituents of all existence, and they designate sets of sensible occurrences. The categories have no specific attribute with the single exception of process. An event is "anything which happens." Naturalists look upon the shift in categories as a mark of vital progress in their system, because the new categories, they believe, enable them to investigate adequately areas of being, such as mind and value, which were unintelligible in the older materialism. On this basis, naturalists admit wide uses of reason, and insist with emphasis upon the universal application of their method.

The foregoing departures from the older materialistic position are at the same time the foci of the tendencies toward idealism, and they are apparent, in varying degrees, in the naturalistic treatment of the main traits of idealism.

The synoptic method of idealism is the method appropriate to philosophy, for, as philosophy includes all the sciences, the synoptic method includes all other philosophical

the state of the s  methods and surpasses them. It is the only method which takes into account all available information and applies the light of reason toward the most coherent explanation of the universe and man, realizing that wholes may possess properties often lacking in their parts. The analytic method of traditional materialism dissected extended matter into "billiard-ball" atoms, and in terms of these, the universe was explained. The scientific method of recent naturalism is still predominantly analytic, but not exclusively so. Sellars, for example, seeks coherence and synthesis. The new categories render the method more flexible, inspiring naturalists to devote thoughtful attention to aspects of being,, such as moral, aesthetic, or logical concepts, which, formerly, were ignored or denied. The insistence upon the unlimited extension is a straining toward the inclusiveness of synopsis. The importance of the rational processes is stressed. Coherence, synthesis, inclusiveness, and reason are suggestions of the method of idealism. Chancing

Idealistic holism is the belief that the truth is the whole; it is the doctrine that the essential nature is located in the whole rather than in its constituent parts, that a part may not be truly known in isolation, but only as it is completely known in its relations to the whole. Antipodal

 to this view was the theory of materialistic atomism which affirmed reality to be in the tiniest known particle. In recent naturalism, there appears an urge toward holism in the insistence upon the unlimited application of the scientific method, and also in the emphasis upon the universe in its totality, specifically inclusive of entities ignored or denied in the older materialism.


In the idealistic view, the ultimate reality is the activity of mind; all things and persons owe their existence to the activity of the Mind of God. In traditional materialism, the ultimate reality was the discrete, granular atom. In recent naturalism, ultimacy is located in the activity, similar to electricity, somehow inherent in matter. Hence, naturalists and idealists agree that being is activity, but disagree regarding the initial source of the activity.

In idealistic thought, mind is the unique and basic reality. Materialism regarded mind as a complex of atoms in motion. Naturalists regard mind as a novel entity, and devote much discussion to cognition, conation, and consciousness. Sellars emphasizes the creativity, the effective energy, and the uniqueness of mind. In these views, naturalists approach idealism. But the naturalistic investigation turns out to be "within the framework of naturalism;" mind is the integrated action of the biological organism; Sellars

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For idealism, value is objective, absolute, eternal, and integral to the structure of the universe. Values are the purposes of the Divine Mind; they may be progressively, but never completely, comprehended by the finite mind for the establishment of norms of action. In traditional materialism, values were explained as internal particles in motion. The naturalistic theory of value is still far removed from idealism. Value is within the realm of human activity and, upon analysis, may be expressed in terms of the natural sciences. There is an advance beyond the former view, however, in the emphasis upon the social locale of value and in the stress upon social justice. Sellars, at times, discusses value in terms of objectivity and cosmic rootage, but, in the end, he explicitly locates it within the limitations of human living.


All in all, recent naturalism is essentially identical with traditional materialism. By the dogma of method, both restrict themselves at the outset to the recognition of only sensible data and hence are at once committed to materialistic conclusions. Nevertheless, "within the framework," there has been a revolutionary change: the conception of reality as active energy not unlike electricity is far removed from the "billiard-ball" atom theory. There



is significance in discarding a belief which has prevailed for some twenty centuries. Already naturalistic thought has embraced to a marked degree views formerly distinctively characteristic of idealism, auggesting a liberalism among recent naturalists which portends further advances toward idealistic beliefs.

## CONCLUSIONS

- 1. Recent naturalists, influenced by current scientific developments, are rather generally adopting views traditionally characteristic of idealists.
- 2. Traditionally, idealists and materialists have held opposing views regarding method, holism, reality, mind, and value.
- 3. Ambiguity and obscurity surround the meaning of the term <u>nature</u>. It seems wise to retain the clear and specific definition which construes <u>nature</u> as denoting physical reality.
- 4. In the naturalistic view, <u>nature</u> is all of reality inclusive of man in all his aspects, mental, moral, and physical; it is a self-sufficient, self-developing system




with no supernatural nor transcendental sanctions; it is homogeneous throughout its structure, and in all its parts susceptible to investigation by the physical or natural sciences.

- 5. The crux of recent naturalistic philosophy is the belief in the sole and exclusive validity of the scientific method which is restricted to sensory data. Consequently, naturalists deny all supersensible existence.
- 6. Recent naturalism and traditional materialism are identical in their affirmation of the exclusive validity of the scientific method, of the primacy of matter, Recent naturalism departs significantly from materialism in the establishment of the new basic categories of events, qualities, and relations.
- 7. A notable trend toward idealism is found in the recent naturalist's conception of the scientific method. The current scientific method, in its departure from the limitations of strict analysis and in its emphasis upon reason and reflection, tends toward the synoptic method of idealism.
- 3. Secondly, naturalists seek the idealistic goal of holism in their attempt to explain the <u>whole</u> universe, specifically inclusive of the mental and moral aspects of man, which were unintelligible in the mechanistic theory.
  - 9. Thirdly, naturalists have adopted the idealistic

. 1 · · view that being is activity.

- 10. Fourthly, naturalists in general have adopted the idealistic recognition of the unique qualities of mind, and Sellars, in particular, asserts the creative activity and efficacy of mind.
- ll. Finally, in naturalistic discussion of value, a trend toward idealism is apparent in the emphasis upon social justice and in a liberal attitude the objectivity of value.













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